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INTRODUCTION

Once only thought possible in the realm of science fiction, today,
scientists are able to edit genes in human embryos using a technique that
employs a Clustered, Regularly Interspaced, Short Palindromic Repeat
(CRISPR) and a CRISPR associated protein (Cas)—typically Cas-9. 1 For
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University and her Master of Science in Chemistry from University of California, San Diego.
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ease, this comment will refer to the CRISPR system, inclusive of the Cas
protein, as CRISPR/Cas-9.
David Cyranoski, a well-respected Nature editor, 2 remarked that
CRISPR/Cas-9 technologies will trigger a “Sputnik 2.0.” 3 Shockingly, China
has already used CRISPR/Cas-9 in twin girls to remove part of a gene that
is responsible for causing HIV. 4 Similarly, CRISPR/Cas-9 has been used on
human cancer cells, 5 and it has the potential to be therapeutic for aggressive
forms of lung cancer. 6 CRISPR/Cas-9 also enables researchers to produce
specific types of tissues by altering genes in pluripotent stem cells. 7
See Alberto Cebrian-Serrano & Benjamin Davies, CRISPR-Cas Orthologues and Variants:
Optimizing the Repertoire, Specificity and Delivery of Genome Engineering Tools, 28

1

MAMMALIAN GENOME 247, 247 (2017) (noting that Cas-9 is the most commonly used
nuclease of the CRISPR-Cas system). Cebrian-Serrano further remarks that the discovery of
CRISPR and CRISPR-associated systems have “revolutionized” biomedical research in the
genetic modification field. Id. Indeed, CRISPR has already completely surpassed the genetic
editing tools that preceded it and has shown great potential in diverse fields, including:
“functional genomics, genome-wide screening studies, therapeutic gene therapy[,] and
agricultural applications.” Id.
Nature is one of the most prestigious scientific journals that only publishes the finest peerreviewed research. About the Journal, NATURE, https://www.nature.com/nature/about
[https://perma.cc/4TRG-8DJD].
David Cyranoski, CRISPR Gene-Editing Tested in a Person for the First Time, NATURE
NEWS (Nov. 15, 2016), http://www.nature.com/news/crispr-gene-editing-tested-in-a-personfor-the-first-time-1.20988 [https://perma.cc/AL3A-5ZDJ].
Marilynn Marchione, Chinese Researcher Claims First Gene-Edited Babies, AP NEWS
(Nov.
26,
2018),
https://www.apnews.com/4997bb7aa36c45449b488e19ac83e86d
[https://perma.cc/4T5W-HQ53]. In exchange for free fertility treatment, parents consented
to genetic experimentation on their embryos. Id. The lead scientist, He Jiankui, was
attempting to create embryos that were HIV resistant. Id. Although there was no
independent confirmation of Jiankui’s claim of successful editing, there was a large outcry
from many well-known scientists that such experimentation is unconscionable at this time.
Id. The laws in the United States generally track this thinking, as this type of gene editing is
outlawed. Id. The general concern is that such experimentation is unsafe and could lead to
deleterious effects. Id. In particular, the DNA changes imposed by the CRISPR/Cas-9 system
could be passed down for many generations—creating a seemingly endless class of people
who could be injured. Id. Moreover, the CRISPR/Cas-9 system could harm other DNA in
a person. Id. Currently, China has reported that other comparable experimentation is “on
hold” until the safety of the procedure is verified. Id.
See Marta Martinez-Lage, Pilar Puig-Serra, Pablo Menendez, Raul Torres-Ruiz & Sandra
Rodriguez-Perales, CRISPR/Cas9 for Cancer Therapy: Hopes and Challenges, 6
BIOMEDICINES 105, 113 (2018) (“In 2016, a team led by oncologist Lu You at Sichuan
University, China were the first to inject a patient with aggressive lung cancer with T-cells
edited by CRISPR/Cas9 to disable PD-1.”).
Cyranoski, supra note 3.
David Baltimore, Paul Berg, Michael Botchan, Dana Carroll, R. Alta Charo, George
Church, Jacob E. Corn, George Q. Daley, Jennifer A. Doudna, Marsha Fenner, Henry T.
Greely, Martin Jinek, G. Steven Martin, Edward Penhoet, Jennifer Puck, Samuel H.
Sternberg, Jonathan S. Weissman & Keith R. Yamamoto, A Prudent Path Forward for
Genomic Engineering and Germline Gene Modification, 348 SCIENCE 36, 36 (2015).
2

3

4

5

6
7
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Furthermore, researchers can use CRISPR/Cas-9 to replicate the genetic
basis for various human diseases, which will provide unprecedented insight
into otherwise enigmatic diseases. 8 Ultimately, at this early stage, the
budding uses of CRISPR/Cas-9 extend to sickle cell anemia, cystic fibrosis,
muscular dystrophy, 9 cancer, eye diseases, 10 and HIV. 11
With the rapid strides made in genetic editing, it does not seem farfetched that parents will eventually use CRISPR/Cas-9 to select genetic
characteristics for their child. Indeed, parents can already use preexisting
technologies for eugenic selection of embryos with in vitro fertilization (IVF)
and preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). 12 Unfortunately,
CRISPR/Cas-9 is not a perfectly effective system, and it can introduce
mutations at unintended sites in the genome. 13 These unintended mutations
are termed “off-target effects,” and they can implicate unwanted physical
appearance, cell death, or disease. 14

8

Id.

Patrick D. Hsu, Eric S. Lander & Feng Zhang, Development and Applications of CRISPRCas9 for Genome Engineering, 157 CELL 1262, 1274 (2014) (“Although Cas9 has already
been widely used as a research tool, a particularly exciting future direction is the development
of Cas9 as a therapeutic technology for treating genetic disorders. For a monogenic recessive
disorder due to loss-of-function mutations (such as cystic fibrosis, sickle-cell anemia, or
Duchenne muscular dystrophy), Cas9 may be used to correct the causative mutation.”).
Antonio Regalado, First Human Test of CRISPR Proposed, MIT TECH. REV. (June 16,
2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601717/first-human-test-of-crispr-proposed
[https://perma.cc/T9U6-DRN4].
Akshat Rathi, Chinese Researchers Have Genetically Modified Human Embryos—Yet
Again, QUARTZ (Apr. 9, 2016), http://qz.com/658537/chinese-researchers-have-geneticallymodified-human-embryos-yet-again/ [https://perma.cc/AS2Y-53J].
See Julian Savulescu, Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select the Best Children,
15 BIOETHICS 413, 413–15 (2001) (discussing that couples should select the child that is
likely to have the best life when using in vitro fertilization and preimplantation genetic
diagnosis to eugenically select embryos). Savulescu supports past eugenic selection for
eradicating disease and argues that children should be selected based off non-disease genes,
like intelligence. Id. at 413. Savulescu takes a controversial stance, reasoning that this
selection of non-disease genes should be maintained even if it increases social inequality. Id.
See generally Puping Liang, Yanwen Xu, Xiya Zhang, Chenhui Ding, Rui Huang, Zhen
Zhang, Jie Lv, Xiaowei Xie, Yuxi Chen, Yujing Li, Ying Sun, Yaofu Bai, Zhou Songyan,
Wenbin Ma, Canquan Zhou & Junjiu Huang, CRISPR/Cas9-Mediated Gene Editing in
Human Tripronuclear Zygotes, 6 PROTEIN & CELL 363 (2015). For example, Liang notes
that CRISPR/Cas-9 has “notable off-target effects in human 3PN embryos.” Id. at 366.
See Sharon Begley, Do CRISPR Enthusiasts Have Their Head in the Sand About the
Safety
of
Gene
Editing?,
STAT
(July
18,
2016),
https://www.statnews.com/2016/07/18/crispr-off-target-effects/
[https://perma.cc/MC2ZFS54]. Off-target effects have been an issue ever since CRISPR/Cas-9 was first reported. Yu
Kang, Chu Chu, Fang Wang & Yuyu Niu, CRISPR/Cas9-Mediated Genome Editing in
Nonhuman Primates, 12 DISEASE MODELS & MECHANISMS 1, 5 (2019). “A significant
number of experiments revealed undesired cleavage by Cas9 at off-target genome sites at
which the DNA sequence was partly homologous (with one or more mismatches) to the 209

10

11

12

13

14
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More troubling than off-target effects is the thought that a parent
may use CRISPR/Cas-9 to purposefully impose a defect on their child.
Although seemingly improbable, this has been done in the past. 15 For
example, parents have intentionally utilized assisted reproductive
technology to have a deaf child. 16 Moreover, some IVF clinics allow parents
to select a disabled child before implantation. 17
Each year, approximately 78,000 infants are born who were
conceived using assisted reproductive technology. 18 As parents are already
base sgRNA.” Id. Avoiding off-target activity is one of the major challenges that scientist face
when editing a human genome. Id.
See Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Creating Children with Disabilities: Parental Tort Liability
for Preimplantation Genetic Interventions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 299, 304 (2008) [hereinafter
Smolensky, Creating Children] (“[D]espite the general expectation that parents will make
beneficial genetic choices for their future children, this may not always be the case. In fact,
some evidence suggests that parental preferences for arguably harmful interventions are
real.”). Although the majority of parents utilize PGD to select embryos without disabilities,
there are reported cases of parents using PGD to intentionally select socially disfavored traits.
Brigham A. Fordham, Disability and Designer Babies, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 1473, 1480
(2011).
See, e.g., Merle Spriggs, Lesbian Couple Create a Child Who Is Deaf Like Them, 28 J.
MED. ETHICS 283, 283 (2002). A lesbian couple intentionally sought out a deaf sperm donor
to increase the chances of having a deaf child. Id. However, when they were turned away
from donor clinics because sperm banks disqualify donors who have congenital deafness,
they turned to a deaf friend and asked for his donation. Id. The women hoped to have a
deaf child because both women were born deaf and want to share their culture with their
children. Id. The women achieved their goal and had a deaf daughter, but their son was born
with partial hearing in his right ear. Id. Doctors have recommended hearing aids to help the
son develop normal speaking skills, but the parents are refusing. Id. Although the women’s
choice has been sharply criticized, others have been sympathetic to their quest. Id.; see
generally Savulescu, supra note 12 (discussing whether there are good reasons for honoring
such requests for disability selection). It seems that deafness is not the only trait that parents
seek to impose, as parents have also attempted to select for other disabilities, like dwarfism.
Dov Fox, Essay: Reproductive Negligence, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 180 (2017); see also
Fordham, supra note 15, at 1480 (noting that in 1995, a couple utilized PGD to select for a
child that had achondroplasia, a form of short-limbed dwarfism). This goes to show that
some parents will intentionally seek having a child that is disabled and may even take active
measures to ensure that the child is affected by this defect.
Susannah Baruch, David Kaufman, & Kathy L. Hudson, Genetic Testing of Embryos:
Practices and Perspectives of US In Vitro Fertilization Clinics, 89 FERTILITY & STERILITY
1053, 1054–55 (2008) (describing a 2006 survey of 186 fertility clinics, where 3% of clinics
reported that they used PGD to help parents select an embryo that carried a disability).
Currently, there are no laws in the United States discussing the legality of a parent’s direct
genetic intervention to have a child with a particular trait or disability. DENA S. DAVIS,
GENETIC DILEMMAS: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY, PARENTAL CHOICES, AND
CHILDREN’S FUTURES 86–87 (2d ed. 2010). Consequently, so long as the technology exists,
parents are free to impose any trait on their embryo—even defects. See Fordham, supra note
15.
ART Success Rates, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Sept. 2,
2020), http://www.cdc.gov/art/reports/index.html [https://perma.cc/9PEE-7SE7].
15

16

17

18
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using existing medical technology to select potential children, 19 it seems
likely that some parents will try to utilize CRISPR/Cas-9 in the reproductive
context. Seventy-eight thousand infants are a remarkable class of potential
plaintiffs. Consequently, the American legal system needs to be ready to
articulate a plausible claim and method of recovery for children born
injured from CRISPR/Cas-9.
In formulating such a claim, this comment will analyze two
scenarios: (1) when a doctor performs CRISPR/Cas-9 with the goal of
producing a healthy baby, but the child suffers off-target effects; and (2)
when a doctor uses CRISPR/Cas-9 to purposefully impose a defect on a
child. In an effort to apply preexisting legal frameworks to such novel
situations, this comment will explore the aforementioned scenarios through
an analysis of tort law.
Tort law has been applied in similar situations—specifically,
preconception and prenatal harms. 20 Although these claims were
traditionally uncommon, tort law has expanded in recent years to keep pace
with medical advances made in areas of reproductive health. 21 When
adjudicating a child’s tort claim for a prenatal harm, some courts have
discussed the child’s “right to begin life with a sound mind and body.” 22 This
See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text.
Compare Womack v. Buchhorn, 187 N.W.2d 218 (Mich. 1971) (discussing prenatal tort
injuries), with Martin v. St. John Hosp. & Med. Ctr. Corp., 517 N.W.2d 787, 789 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1994) (discussing preconception tort injuries); see also infra Section II.C.
See Matthew Browne, Note, Preconception Tort Law in an Era of Assisted Reproduction:
Applying a Nexus Test for Duty, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2555, 2556 (2001) (discussing
19
20

21

preconception tort claims). There were relatively few preconception tort cases before the
1970s, but the claims have become more common with: (1) the ability to trace the cause of
the preconception injury; (2) increasingly common medical procedures that can give rise to
preconception tort injuries; (3) nationwide injury of women and their children from faulty
pharmaceuticals; and (4) toxic exposure cases that altered parental chromosomes and
resulted in deformed children. Id. The author takes great care to point out that “[i]ntentional
manipulation of human reproductive cells . . . is all but assured in an age of rapidly
developing genetic and assisted reproductive technology.” Id.
In Smith v. Brennan, the New Jersey Supreme Court articulated the open future legal right
when enumerating why a child should be able to recover for prenatal injuries caused by a
third person. 157 A.2d 497, 502–03 (N.J. 1960). In doing so, the court commented: “justice
requires that the principle be recognized that a child has a legal right to begin life with a sound
mind and body. If the wrongful conduct of another interferes with that right, and it can be
established by competent proof that there is a causal connection between the wrongful
interference and the harm suffered by the child when born, damages for such harm should
be recoverable by the child.” Id. Some scholars have embraced this reasoning, arguing that
if parents selectively edit embryos to have disabled children, those parents are liable to the
children if their selection infringes upon the child’s right to an open future. See Smolensky,
Creating Children, supra note 15, at 309–10. But see Fordham, supra note 15, at 1512–26
(involving a discussion against recognizing a child’s open future as a legally cognizable right).
Generally, Fordham argues that “[s]econd-guessing parental decisions about socially
disfavored physical traits only disrupts the parent-child relationship and suggests that
22
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lends itself to a moral framework that recognizes a child’s right to an “open
future” in the context of tort law. 23 Consistent with this “open right,” a child
with negligent genetic editing will sue for negligence. For purposeful
defective genetic editing, the child’s cause of action will be battery.
Note that for either scenario, the current judicial stance on wrongful
life claims will impede recovery. 24 However, this comment argues that, in
the context of CRISPR/Cas-9, the judicial reasoning behind denying
wrongful life claims does not apply. To avoid the stigma of wrongful life
claims, this comment will refer to the child’s claims as mistaken
manipulation.
Part II of this comment summarizes CRISPR/Cas-9, introduces
wrongful life, and highlights current case law on prenatal and preconception
torts. 25 Part III analyzes extending the framework gained from tort law to
negligent genetic editing and purposeful imposition of defects.26
Furthermore, Part III explores the elements of negligence and battery and
their relation to CRISPR/Cas-9 mistaken manipulation claims. 27 Finally,
Part IV will seek to dispel any counterarguments that may attempt to bar
recovery. 28
II.

CRISPR/CAS-9 AND WRONGFUL LIFE

Part II will provide the relevant background information on
CRISPR/Cas-9, wrongful life claims, and prenatal harms. 29 Section A will
describe the general science and history behind CRISPR/Cas-9. 30 Section B
will briefly explore wrongful life claims, emphasizing the judicial reasoning

discriminatory attitudes and practices are natural and acceptable.” Id. at 1527. Moreover,
Fordham is of the opinion that tort law is inappropriate in situations where parents would
intentionally impose a defect simply because these situations are uncommon. Id. at 1528.
Thus, Fordham stipulates it would be better left to the legislature to impose prohibitions. Id.
at 1527.
Joel Feinberg, The Child’s Right to an Open Future, in WHOSE CHILD? CHILDREN’S
RIGHTS, PARENTAL AUTHORITY, AND STATE POWER 124, 126 (William Aiken & Hugh
LaFollette eds., 1980).
See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. 1967) (“This Court cannot weigh
the value of life with impairments against the nonexistence of life itself. By asserting that he
should not have been born, the infant plaintiff makes it logically impossible for a court to
measure his alleged damages because of the impossibility of making the comparison required
by compensatory remedies.”).
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
23

24

25
26
27
28
29
30

See id.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part II.
See infra Section II.A
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behind rejecting these claims. 31 Finally, Section C will provide a framework
on prenatal and preconception torts. 32

A.

Scientific Background

This section will seek to simplistically describe the basic concepts
that underlie genetic editing and how they relate to CRISPR/Cas-9,
beginning with human biology.

1.

Human Biology

Fundamentally, the first step to forming life begins when a sperm
and an egg unite to form a zygote. 33 The zygote’s cell will then divide and
start to specialize into various tissues after a few days. 34 After eight weeks,
the zygote is termed a fetus, 35 and the genes in the fetus form the basis for
hereditary traits. 36 There are approximately 22,000 genes in the human
genome that are packed into 23 pairs of chromosomes. 37 Every gene is
encoded as DNA, 38 and the fetus’s DNA is essentially that individual’s
blueprint for growth, functionality, and physical traits. 39 With very few
exceptions, every cell possesses the same DNA that the zygote had. 40
DNA is a double-stranded molecule that is arranged in a doublehelix. 41 It is essentially composed of four bases, a sugar molecule, and a
phosphate molecule. 42 The four bases are chemically connected to the
sugar-phosphate backbone, which is the exterior framework of the DNA
31
32
33
34
35
36

See infra Section II.B.
See infra Section II.C.

T.W. SADLER, LANGMAN’S MEDICAL EMBRYOLOGY 10 (12th ed. 2012).

Id. at 38–39.
Id. at 96.
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 580 (2013)

(discussing the underlying foundations of genetics). Although this case generally concerns
whether naturally occurring subject matter can be patented, the Supreme Court discusses the
science behind DNA as well as the creation of proteins from DNA. See id.
37
38

Id.
Id.

Like the letters in an alphabet forming words and sentences, the sequence of DNA forms
the general structure for an organism’s growth and development. What Is DNA?, U.S. NAT’L
LIBR. OF MED. (Sept. 17, 2020), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/basics/dna
[https://perma.cc/33XH-JMWL].
See A Brief Guide to Genomics, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST. (Aug. 27,
2015), https://www.genome.gov/18016863/a-brief-guide-to-genomics
[https://perma.cc/4N2G-MLJD] (“An organism’s complete set of DNA is called its genome.
Virtually every single cell in the body contains a complete copy of the approximately 3 billion
DNA base pairs, or letters, that make up the human genome.”).
ROBERT F. SCHLEIF, GENETICS AND MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 22–23 (2d ed. 1993).
39

40

41
42

Id.
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helix. 43 The four possible bases in DNA are adenine, thymine, cytosine, and
guanine. 44 These are commonly abbreviated as A, T, C, and G,
respectively. 45 Each base pairs with its complementary base when forming
the DNA double-strand: A pairs with T, and C pairs with G. 46 Importantly,
complementary base pairing allows each strand of the DNA to act as a
template to ensure correct replication. 47
One base pair, one sugar molecule, and one phosphate group form
a nucleotide. 48 Three nucleotides are termed a codon. 49 In turn, codons code
for amino acids, which form proteins. 50 As there are only four bases and
three are needed to form a codon, simple math reveals that there are sixtyfour different combinations available for a codon sequence. 51 Of these
combinations, even a slight variation can code for a different protein,
thereby changing the organism’s genetic code. 52 Changes in the genetic code
are appropriately termed mutations. 53 The extent of a mutation can vary
significantly, but it can lead to disease or increased risks of disease. 54

2.

CRISPR/Cas-9

Targeted genome editing is a process that allows scientists to mutate
a gene of interest by deleting segments of the gene, inserting more genetic

Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 569 U.S. at 581 (noting that the sugar-phosphate backbone
forms the outside framework of the DNA helix).
SCHLEIF, supra note 41, at 22.

43

44
45
46

Id.
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 569 U.S. at 581 (“The possible nucleotides are adenine

(A), thymine (T), cytosine (C), and guanine (G), each of which binds naturally with another
nucleotide: A pairs with T; C pairs with G.”).
SCHLEIF, supra note 41.
Anne Marie Helmenstine, What Are the 3 Parts of a Nucleotide? How Are They
Connected?, THOUGHTCO. (Jan. 25, 2020), https://www.thoughtco.com/what-are-the-partsof-nucleotide-606385 [https://perma.cc/GLW7-4N6L].
Codon, NATURE EDUC., https://www.nature.com/scitable/definition/codon-155/
[https://perma.cc/XGA9-YVG5].
Protein Structure, NATURE EDUC., http://www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/proteinstructure-14122136 [https://perma.cc/UQZ5-4TEF].
JEREMY M. BERG, JOHN TYMOCZKO & LUBERT STRYER, BIOCHEMISTRY 7 (5th ed. 2002).
Simplistically, 4 x 4 x 4 = 64. The number four is used because there are four possible bases
(A,G,T,C), and four is repeated three times over because one codon consists of three bases.
See Gene Expression, NATURE EDUC., https://www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/geneexpression-14121669 [https://perma.cc/W7DX-W8P8]; see also Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 582 (2013) (noting that changing only one
letter in the genetic code can produce entirely different proteins).
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 569 U.S. at 582.
Id. (noting that although some mutations may be harmless, other mutations can cause dire
consequences).
47
48

49

50

51

52

53
54
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sequences, or substituting some genes for other genes. 55 The general aim of
genetic editing is to modify a specific characteristic of an organism by
changing a small portion of the organism’s genetic code. 56 In doing so, there
is great potential for curing various genetic diseases. 57 Although there are
multiple approaches to targeted genome editing, 58 CRISPR/Cas-9 has
revolutionized the field, and over a thousand papers have been published
on the method. 59 The immense number of papers published on
CRISPR/Cas-9 demonstrates both the popularity of the method and the
general outlook in the scientific community that CRISPR/Cas-9 is an
efficient and promising method for genetic editing. 60
Simplistically, CRISPR/Cas-9 technology harnesses a defense
mechanism that bacteria use to protect against invading viruses. 61 When
See What are Genome Editing and CRISPR-Cas9?, MEDLINEPLUS,
https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/genomicresearch/genomeediting
[https://perma.cc/6EJZJQ5H]. Types of mutations that can occur in the genome include the following: point
mutations or substitutions, insertions, and deletions. Jay Yang, Genetic Mutation, SINGER
INSTRUMENTS (Mar. 23, 2015), https://www.singerinstruments.com/resource/what-aregenetic-mutation/ [https://perma.cc/9N6R-BY7D]. A point mutation involves substituting a
single nucleotide with another nucleotide. Id. Insertions occur when nucleotides are added
to the gene sequence, while deletions involve deletions of nucleotides from the original gene
sequence. Id. Regardless of the exact type of mutation, a mutation can lead to vastly different
consequences. Id. Unfortunately, mutations can lead to deleterious results that affect the
organism’s fitness. Id. Contrastingly, mutations can also be advantageous to the organism or
have no effect at all on the organism. Id.
Jennifer Walker-Daniels, CRISPR and Genomic Engineering, LABOME (Mar. 22, 2013),
https://www.labome.com/method/Genomic-Engineering.html#ref29
[https://perma.cc/8FS5-Q73Y].
See id. The Supreme Court has recognized the importance in studying genetics, realizing
that it can “lead to valuable medical breakthroughs.” Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 569
U.S. at 582.
See Walker-Daniels, supra note 56 (discussing CRISPR and other genetic editing
methodologies). Briefly, other common methods include meganucleases, zinc-finger
nucleases, and transcription activator-like effector nucleases. Id. Although these methods
have experienced success in the past, they are both costly and time inefficient. Id. CRISPR
systems have been deemed superior in part because CRISPR utilizes an already existing
immune defense and a guide RNA instead of a new DNA binding protein. Id. RNA
molecules are typically more cost efficient and easier to synthesize than DNA binding
proteins. Id.
Samuel H. Sternberg & Jennifer A. Doudna, Expanding the Biologist’s Toolkit with
CRISPR-Cas9, 58 MOLECULAR CELL 568, 568 (2015) (“Beginning in January 2013, a flurry
of studies demonstrated that site-specific DNA editing in eukaryotic cells could be achieved
through the heterologous expression of Cas9 together with a guide RNA. Two years and
>1,000 publications later . . . , the technology has gone viral. The genomes of virtually all
model plants and animals have been modified with CRISPR-Cas9, and creative new tools
continue to expand the capabilities of this system.”) (internal citation omitted)).
See Walker-Daniels, supra note 56.
Rotem Sorek, Victor Kunin & Philip Hugenholtz, CRISPR—A Widespread System that
Provides Acquired Resistance Against Phages in Bacteria and Archaea, 6 NATURE REVS.
MICROBIOLOGY 181, 186 (2008).
55

56

57

58

59

60
61
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bacteria are first exposed to a virus, CRISPR systems incorporate segments
of the virus’s genetic code into the bacteria’s DNA. 62 As a result, subsequent
exposure to the same virus will trigger an enzyme to find the virus and
destroy it. 63 The enzyme that targets the virus is known as Cas, and the most
commonly used Cas enzyme is Cas-9. 64
The following three substances are required for a CRISPR system
to successfully cleave target DNA: (1) a Cas enzyme that cleaves the DNA;
(2) a CRISPR RNA (crRNA) that directs the system to the targeted DNA;
and (3) an auxiliary trans-activating RNA (tracrRNA) that recruits the Cas
enzyme and hybridizes with the crRNA. 65 The crRNA and tracrRNA fuse
together, and the resulting structure is usually called a single-guide RNA
(sgRNA). 66 The sequence of the sgRNA is of the utmost importance because
this is what guides the CRISPR system to the target DNA. 67 This comment
will assume that the Cas enzyme employed is a Cas-9 enzyme, which is why
the CRISPR system will be referred to as CRISPR/Cas-9.
Notably, CRISPR/Cas-9 genetic editing is not surefire, and offtarget effects are an immense concern. 68 Off-target effects happen when the
Martin Jinek, Krzysztof Chylinski, Ines Fonfara, Michael Hauer, Jennifer A. Doudna &
Emmanuelle Charpentier, A Programmable Dual-RNA-Guided DNA Endonuclease in
Adaptive Bacterial Immunity, 337 SCIENCE 816, 816–17 (2012).
62

Id.
See Cebrian-Serrano, supra note 1. Other Cas enzymes include the following: SaCas9,
NmeCas9, CjCas9, StCas9, LbCpf1, and AsCrpf1. See Importance of the PAM Sequence
in CRISPR Experiments, SYNTHEGO tbl.1, https://www.synthego.com/guide/how-to-use-

63
64

crispr/pam-sequence [https://perma.cc/2VLU-KWUJ]. Notably, the first two letters of every
item in the aforementioned list correlate to what organism the nuclease was isolated from.
See id. Consistent with that naming trend, the reference to Cas-9 in this paper would be
identified as SpCas9, as the nuclease was isolated from Streptococcus pyogenes. See id.
Xiao-Hui Zhang, Louis Y Tee, Xiao-Gang Wang, Qun-Shan Huang & Shi-Hua Yang, OffTarget Effects in CRISPR/Cas9-Mediated Genome Engineering, 4 MOLECULAR THERAPYNUCLEIC ACIDS 1, 1 (2015) (reconstructing the CRISPR/Cas-9 system in mammalian cells
using the aforementioned three components).
See, e.g., id. (“The crRNA and tracrRNA duplexes can also be fused to generate a chimeric
single-guide RNA (sgRNA).”).
See generally Liang et al., supra note 13 (discussing sgRNA). Note that this article refers to
sgRNA as gRNA. See id. The sgRNA, or gRNA, largely dictates the specificity of the
CRISPR/Cas-9 system. Id. at 364.
See Begley, supra note 14. Even scientists that discuss the great potential that CRISPR/Cas9 usually conclude with remarks that the system is not ready for full-scale implementation.
See Martinez-Lage et al., supra note 5 (concluding that “[t]he great expectations surrounding
CRISPR gene editing needs to be coupled with strategic planning, including enabling
regulatory processes to ensure the successful development of this advanced gene editingbased modality. What is clear, nevertheless, is that the technology still requires optimization
before widespread translation into the clinic, especially with regards to efficacy, safety, and
specificity.”). Thus, it is critical that the possibility of off-target effects is eliminated before the
CRISPR/Cas-9 system is ever used as a therapeutic reagent. Yu Kang et al., supra note 14, at
5.
65

66

67

68
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Cas-9 enzyme accidentally cleaves an unintended site in the genome, 69
because the sgRNA possessed sufficient homology with non-target DNA. 70
The exact effect of off-target editing is still unknown, but leading scientist
Dr. J. Keith Joung expressed concern that it may lead to an increased risk
of cancer. 71 Indeed, any off-target editing could potentially lead to significant
cellular toxicity. 72 In a similar vein, it is generally accepted that off-target
effects could lead to unwanted physical appearance, cell death, or disease. 73
Due to these concerns, prominent scientists have warned that there needs
to be a cautious approach in applying CRISPR/Cas-9 to human genetics. 74
Although scientists are diligently working to decrease the rates of
off-target effects, 75 and to develop off-target predicators, 76 there is no way to
“recall” a bad gene. 77 Thus, with the future of genetic editing leaning toward
Hannah R. Kempton & Lei S. Qi, When Genome Editing Goes Off-Target, 364 SCIENCE
234, 234 (2019).
See Zhang et al., supra note 65, at 2. The sgRNA is typically twenty nucleotides long and
up to five nucleotide mismatches between the sgRNA, and the DNA is sufficient for offtarget binding. Liang et al., supra note 13, at 364. Thus, a DNA sequence that is percent
dissimilar to the sgRNA could result in off-target binding and subsequent cleaving of nontarget DNA.
See Begley, supra note 14. Dr. J. Keith Joung is a professor of pathology at Harvard Medical
School. Id. Dr. Joung holds two advanced degrees: a M.D. from Harvard Medical School
and a Ph.D. from Harvard University. Joung Lab, CTR. FOR COMPUTATIONAL AND
INTEGRATIVE
BIOLOGY,
https://ccib.mgh.harvard.edu/joung#research
[https://perma.cc/J3L9-76HV]. Dr. Joung is a respected, recognized leader in the genetic
editing field and has taken the lead on the discussion pertaining to the accuracy in genetic
editing. Prashant Nair, QnAs with Jennifer Doudna, PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. OF
THE U.S. OF AM.
(May 3, 2016), https://www.pnas.org/content/113/18/4884
[https://perma.cc/74KN-XCLG].
See Walker-Daniels, supra note 56.
Begley, supra note 14.
See, e.g., Baltimore et al., supra note 7, at 37–38. The article calls for a thorough
investigation into the general safety and efficacy of CRISPR/Cas-9 before it is used
therapeutically. Id. at 37. Moving forward, the article puts forth four recommendations: (1)
discouraging any attempts to use CRISPR/Cas-9 on humans, (2) creating a forum where
scientists and leading bioethicists can communicate and educate others, (3) encouraging
transparent research pertaining to the efficacy of CRISPR/Cas-9, and (4) convening a global
group of experts to discuss and recommend internationally implemented policies. Id. at 37–
38.
See, e.g., Liang et al., supra note 13.
See, e.g., Daesik Kim, Sangsu Bae, Jeongbin Park, Eunji Kim, Seokjoong Kim, Hye
Ryeong Yu, Jinha Hwang, Jong-II Kim & Jin-Soo Kim, Digenome-seq: Genome-Wide
Profiling of CRISPR-Cas9 Off-Target Effects in Human Cells, 12 NATURE METHODS 237,
237 (2015). Other notable predicators include Guide-seq, HTGTS, SELEX, BLESS,
DISCOVER-Seq, Digenome-seq, High Throughput Profiling by David Liu, and CIRCLEseq. See generally Kempton & Qi, supra note 69 (discussing off-target effects).
Eric S. Lander, Brave New Genome, 373 NEW ENG. J. MED. 5, 7 (2015). As scientists have
no ability to “recall” a bad gene, the best course of action is one of “great caution.” Id. This
caution is reflected in scientific articles that discuss the voluntary applications of
CRISPR/Cas-9. See, e.g., Liang et al., supra note 13, at 363 (“[O]ur work highlights the
69

70

71

72
73
74

75
76

77
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CRISPR/Cas-9, it is necessary that our legal system determine a method for
compensating CRISPR/Cas-9 victims.

B.

Wrongful Life

The wrongful life claim is essentially a medical malpractice claim
a child brings for being born with a disability or disease. 78 Wrongful life
claims contrast from wrongful birth claims. 79 Generally, wrongful birth
claims involve a parent’s claim against a medical provider, alleging that
negligent treatment or advice deprived the parent of avoiding the birth of
the child. 80 The majority of courts allow parents to sue for wrongful birth
claims, 81 but wrongful life claims are generally denied. 82 Briefly, the trend for
accepting wrongful birth claims is attributed to: (1) advancements in
healthcare that make the detection of defects readily available and (2) a
woman’s established right of privacy encompassing her choice to terminate

pressing need to further improve the fidelity and specificity of the CRISPR/Cas9 platform, a
prerequisite for any clinical applications of CRISPR/Cas9-mediated editing.”); see also
Baltimore et al., supra notes 7, 74, and accompanying text.
Gami v. Mullikin Med. Ctr., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 819, 823 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 957 n.4 (Cal. 1982) (“While courts and commentators
have not always been consistent in their terminology, ‘wrongful life’ has generally referred to
actions brought on behalf of children, and ‘wrongful birth’ to actions brought by parents.”).
See Wrongful Life Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see also Cichewicz
v. Salesin, 854 N.W.2d 901, 907 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014) (“A wrongful-birth claim is brought
by the parents of a child with a birth defect and generally alleges that the defendant’s failure
to inform them of the risk of the birth defect deprived them of the opportunity to avoid or
terminate the pregnancy.”).
See, e.g., Keel v. Banach, 624 So. 2d 1022, 1029 (Ala. 1993) (“[T]he great weight of
authority to the contrary forces us to agree with the majority of the courts and the legal
commentators and to hold that an action for the wrongful birth of a genetically or congenitally
defective child may be maintained by the parents of such a child.”). But see Cichewicz, 854
N.W.2d. at 907 (noting that both wrongful life and wrongful birth claims are not permitted
in Michigan). Notably, Michigan abolished both wrongful life claims and wrongful birth
claims in Taylor v. Kurapati, 600 N.W.2d 670, 674–76, 682–84 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
Michigan later codified this ruling in MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 600.2971 (LexisNexis
2001).
Hester v. Dwivedi, 733 N.E.2d 1161, 1166 (Ohio 2000) (noting that wrongful life claims
have been almost universally dismissed by courts in the United States). But see Gami, 22
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 825–28 (recognizing that California permits wrongful life claims). In Gami,
a child sued for wrongful life when a doctor failed to properly conduct alpha fetoprotein
(AFP) testing. Id. at 821. The AFP testing would have revealed a neural defect in the fetus,
and the mother would have then chosen to abort the fetus. Id. Because the testing was not
done properly, Nandini was born with “congenital hydrocephalus (water on the brain) and
spina bifida.” Id. The court held that Nandini was entitled to legal protection from negligent
genetic counseling and testing, which is wrongful life. Id. at 827–28.
78
79

80

81

82
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a pregnancy. 83 Taking it one step further, courts have reasoned that wrongful
birth is consistent with the traditional goals of negligence under tort law. 84
In contrast, courts typically reject wrongful life claims on notions
of public policy, 85 and because courts are unable to calculate damages. 86
Regarding public policy, courts have suggested that any life is better than no
life, consequently proposing that wrongful life claims should not be
adjudicated by courts. 87 One court even explicitly stated that the legal world
has “no competence” to answer whether it is better not to be born than to
be born with “gross deficiencies.” 88 Even courts that accept wrongful life

Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 345–46 (N.H. 1986). Consistent with these two principles,
courts have consistently recognized that physicians must adhere to the standards of
reasonable professional performance. Id. at 346. A failure to meet these standards is
recognized in the wrongful birth claim. See id. Considering these foundational principles,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that wrongful birth actions were cognizable. Id. at
348 (citing Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967)). However, the Supreme Court
of New Hampshire cares to note that recognizing such claim will neither promote nor
discourage abortions. Id. at 348. Similarly, the judicial recognition of the claim does not
somehow impart that the child at issue should never have been born. Id.
See Plowman v. Fort Madison Cmty. Hosp., 896 N.W.2d 393, 401 (Iowa 2017). In
Plowman, Iowa joins with the majority of jurisdictions in recognizing a wrongful birth claim.
Id. The court notes that the wrongful birth claim is essentially a medical malpractice claim
that comports well within the elements of negligence. Id. at 401–04. See also Owens v. Foote,
773 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Tenn. 1989) (“[M]edical malpractice suits of this nature, brought by
parents, alleging birth defects of an infant, are not unknown in this State and we see no reason
to endeavor to fit them into some specific category beyond a suit for ordinary negligence.”).
See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 810 (N.Y. 1978) (“Even as a pure question
of law, unencumbered by unresolved issues of fact, the weighing of the validity of a cause of
action seeking compensation for the wrongful causation of life itself casts an almost Orwellian
shadow . . . Any such resolution, whatever it may be, must invariably be colored by notions
of public policy, the validity of which remains, as always, a matter upon which reasonable
men may disagree.”). The court asserts that it has “no competence” to address the issue of
whether it is better to be born injured or never be born at all. Id. at 812. Similarly, the court
is wary of “drawing of artificial and arbitrary boundaries.” Id. at 813 (quoting Howard v.
Lecher, 366 N.E.2d 64, 66 (N.Y. 1977)).
See, e.g., Gleitman, 227 A.2d at 692 (“This Court cannot weigh the value of life with
impairments against the nonexistence of life itself. By asserting that he should not have been
born, the infant plaintiff makes it logically impossible for a court to measure his alleged
damages because of the impossibility of making the comparison required by compensatory
remedies.”).
See Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 447 N.E.2d 385, 388 (Ill. 1983) (affirming the typical
“unwillingness to hold that the birth of a normal healthy child can be judged to be an injury
to the parents” and reasoning that such a notion “offends fundamental values attached to
human life.”). Such courts have typically asserted that public policy requires the conclusion
that the plaintiff has not suffered any legally cognizable injury. Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8,
12–13 (N.J. 1979). To hold otherwise would seemingly disavow the sanctity of human life in
the eyes of most courts. Id. Consequently, these courts have held as a matter of law that any
life, even life with horrendous impairments, is better than no life. Id.
Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 812.
83
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claims have referred to the traditional policy that life is always preferable to
nonlife. 89
This public policy argument tracks closely with Derek Parfit’s
Non-Identity Problem, 90 which arises when a child would not have existed
but for the negligence of another. 91 For instance, a child born from a faulty
tubal ligation would have no tort claim because the child would not have
existed but for the mistake. 92 Note that the non-identity problem arises
when, in different circumstances (i.e., a proper or faulty tubal ligation), a
different number of people would be born. 93 Notwithstanding tubal ligation
issues, Parfit himself addresses situations where, in different circumstances,
the same number of people will be born. 94 In these circumstances, Parfit
suggests that the best choice is to avoid harm and choose the child with the
best potential for a good quality of life. 95
Regarding the quantification of damages, courts often express the
inability to weigh the value of nonexistence with existence, which is required
for compensatory damages. 96 As damages are typically measured by
comparing where the plaintiff would have been to where they are now, some
courts have asserted that it is “logically impossible” to calculate damages. 97
Essentially, courts typically find it abhorrent to attempt to measure the
See, e.g., Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 961 (Cal. 1982).
See generally David Benatar, The Wrong of Wrongful Life, 37 AM. PHIL. Q. 175 (2000).
See generally DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 358–59 (Oxford Univ. Press rev. ed.
1987); see also Barbara Pfeffer Billauer, Wrongful Life in the Age of Crispr-Cas: Using the
Legal Fiction of “The Conceptual Being” to Redress Wrongful Gamete Manipulation, 124
89
90
91

PENN ST. L. REV. 435, 479–80 (2020).
Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Symposium: Parental Tort Liability for Preimplantation Genetic
92

Interventions: Technological Harms, the Social Model of Disability, and Questions of
Identity, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 411, 411 n.6 (2008) [hereinafter Smolensky, Symposium].
PARFIT, supra note 91, at 361.
Id. at 363–64.
Id. (noting that “if the numbers would be the same, it would be worse if those who live have
93
94
95

a lower quality of life than those who would have lived.”).
Bowman v. Davis, 356 N.E.2d 496, 499 n.3 (Ohio 1976); Rich v. Foye, 976 A.2d 819, 836
(Conn. Super. Ct. 2007). But see Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 488–
90 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). Curlender was a matter of first impression in California, concerning
whether a genetically impaired child could sue for preconception negligence. Id. at 814. The
plaintiff was born with Tay-Sachs after a doctor and medical laboratory failed to properly test
her parents’ status as carriers for the diseases. Id. at 815–16. The court decidedly disagreed
with out-of-state courts who held that being born with a disease is not a legally cognizable
injury when the alternative is not being born. Id. at 828–29. Indeed, the court determined
the “real crux” should focus on proximate cause and not a cognizable injury. Id. Meaning,
the court “need not be concerned with the fact that had defendants not been negligent, the
plaintiff might not have come into existence at all.” Id. at 829. The court then found that the
plaintiff’s disease was a legally cognizable injury and that damages were measurable. Id. at
829, 831.
Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. 1967).
96

97
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difference between nonexistence and the value of life with defects. 98 Less
commonly, courts reject wrongful life on the basis of causation. 99 The crux
of this reasoning is that a genetic disorder is not caused by a physician but is
simply inherited. 100
Nonetheless, a small number of plaintiffs have been successful in
pleading all the elements of negligence in wrongful life claims. 101 Currently,
only four states recognize wrongful life claims: California, 102 Washington, 103
Maine, 104 and New Jersey. 105 In these states, the damages are still limited for
wrongful life claims. 106 For instance, the California Supreme Court denied
general damages to an infant who alleged that, but for a physician’s
negligence in diagnosing hereditary deafness, she would not have been
conceived. 107 The court only permitted recovery for “extraordinary expenses
for specialized teaching, training and hearing equipment” associated with
her deafness. 108 In doing so, the court explicitly rejected the traditional public
policy argument that wrongful life claims renounce the sanctity of life. 109 The
court instead put forth the public policy of personal autonomy and “the right
of each individual to make his or her own determination as to the relative
value of life and death.” 110
Unless the CRISPR/Cas-9 child brings suit in one of the four
aforementioned states that recognize wrongful life claims, 111 it is more than
likely that the claim will be rejected as a disguised wrongful life claim. 112
See id. (“By asserting that he should not have been born, the infant plaintiff makes it
logically impossible for a court to measure his alleged damages because of the impossibility
of making the comparison required by compensatory remedies.”).
See Rich, 976 A.2d at 837 (discussing causation and wrongful life). Rich draws attention to
the fact that most diseases are genetic, thus not caused by any doctor. Id. Consequently,
failing to inform the parents of the child’s disease while in utero does not actually cause the
onset of the disease. Id. However, this is not an applicable defense to the CRISPR child’s
mistaken manipulation claim because the CRISPR/Cas-9 editing does indeed cause the
disease. See infra Section III.B.4.
Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741, 744–45 (Mo. 1988).
See, e.g., Gami, v. Mullikin Med. Ctr., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 819, 827 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
Id. at 824.
Wuth v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 359 P.3d 841, 853 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931 (1985).
Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 760 (N.J. 1984); Provenzano v. Integrated Genetics, 22
F. Supp. 2d 406, 413 (D.N.J. 1998).
See, e.g., Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 963 (Cal. 1982).
Id. at 956, 963.
Id. at 965.
Id. at 961–62.
Id. at 962.
See supra text accompanying notes 102–105.
See Sara Weinberger, Sharon Nakar & Dov Greenbaum, They Chose . . . Poorly: A Novel
Cause of Action To Discourage Detrimental Genetic Selection, 43 AM. J.L. & MED. 107,
110 (2017) (discussing that the only current cause of action for a child born with an
intentional, harmful genetic condition is wrongful life).
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Therefore, this comment seeks to enumerate why wrongful life reasoning
does not apply in the two scenarios put forth. 113 As mentioned previously,
this article will term the plaintiff’s claim mistaken manipulation to avoid any
stigmatization of the CRISPR/Cas-9 claim as a wrongful life claim. 114

C.

Injuries in the Prenatal and Preconception Context

A rudimentary history of prenatal and preconception tort claims is
necessary for imparting the elements of a mistaken manipulation claim.
Historically, courts denied prenatal tort claims on the grounds that there is
no duty of care to an unborn child. 115 However, in 1946, the court in
Bonbrest v. Kotz took a radical stance and allowed recovery for prenatal
injuries if the child was viable at the time of injury and subsequently born
alive. 116 In doing so, the court reasoned that “[t]he law is presumed to keep
pace with the sciences.” 117 The court further noted that an unborn child is
considered a human being under tort law only once it is viable. 118 The
reasoning behind the viability mark is that the child could now be
considered a separate entity from the mother. 119 Now, all American
jurisdictions recognize that a child has a claim when they are injured
prenatally and then born alive. 120
Some jurisdictions even recognize prenatal claims when the injury
occurs before the child is viable. 121 For instance, the plaintiff in Smith v.
Brennan sued a negligent tortfeasor when the tortfeasor hit the plaintiff’s
mom in an automobile crash. 122 Although the plaintiff was not viable at the
time of the injury, the court permitted recovery. 123 Similarly, the court in
Womack v. Buchhorn allowed the plaintiff to recover under tort law for
brain injuries that resulted from trauma suffered while the plaintiff was four
months old in utero. 124 In doing so, the court reasoned, “justice requires that
the principle be recognized that a child has a legal right to begin life with a
113

See infra Sections III.A, IV.B.

It is common to coin new terms in this field. See, e.g., Weinberger et al., supra note 112
(proposing a “wrongful selection” cause of action).
See Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 15–16 (1884).
65 F. Supp. 138, 142 (D.D.C. 1946). Because the child was viable, the court recognized
him as a separate entity from his mother, which gave him a right of action. Id. at 142.
Id. at 143.
Id. at 141–42.
114

115
116

117
118
119
120

Id.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869 (AM. L. INST. 1979); G. Edward Powell III,

Embryos as Patients? Medical Provider Duties in the Age of CRISPR/Cas9, 15 DUKE L. &
TECH. REV. 344, 352–53 (2017).
See, e.g., Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497, 504 (N.J. 1960).
Id. at 498.
Id. at 504.
Womack v. Buchhorn, 187 N.W.2d 218, 222 (Mich. 1971).
121
122
123
124
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sound mind and body.” 125 The court then overruled the standing case law
that prevented recovery for prenatal injuries. 126 The court justified its
decision to overrule, stating “the present state of science” required a new
look at judicial thinking. 127
Likewise, a minority of jurisdictions have expanded Bonbrest to
allow recovery when an injury happens before the child is even conceived,
a so-called preconception tort. 128 One court famously used the following
analogy to demonstrate why preconception injuries should be recognized:
Assume a balcony is negligently constructed. Two years
later, a mother and her one-year-old child step onto the
balcony and it gives way, causing serious injury to both the
mother and the child. It would be ludicrous to suggest that
only the mother would have a cause of action against the
builder but, because the infant was not conceived at the
time of the negligent conduct, no duty of care existed
toward the child. 129
In the above case, the time of the negligent act was when the
balcony was first constructed, which was before the hypothesized child was
even conceived. 130 As the court stated, it would be ludicrous to deny recovery
just because the negligent act occurred before conception. 131 Other courts
have expressed that “disallowing . . . claims based upon alleged
Id. (quoting Smith, 157 A.2d at 503).
See Newman v. Detroit, 281 Mich. 60, 63–64 (Mich. 1937). In Newman, a child was
injured in utero when his mother was harmed during a streetcar accident in Detroit. Id. at
125
126

62. The accident occurred twenty-two days prior to the child’s birth, which occurred at the
end of nine months. Id. Thus, the child was viable at the time of his injury and subsequently
born alive. See id. The child was only alive for three months and died from injuries that
resulted from the streetcar accident. Id. The Newman court denied the child’s recovery,
placing significant emphasis on the fact that the “overwhelming weight of authority is . . .
contrary” to allowing recovery for prenatal injuries. Id. at 63. Indeed, the child had no
recognized claim under either common law or any statute. Id. at 64.
Womack, 187 N.W.2d at 222. The Womack court drew attention to the fact that the great
weight of the law in the United States now weighs against the decision in Newman. Id. at
219–22. When Newman was initially decided in 1937, eleven jurisdictions, including
Michigan, denied recovery for prenatal injuries. Id. at 220. However, by the time Womack
was decided in 1971, thirty-four years after Newman, only one jurisdiction still prevented
recovery for prenatal injuries while twenty-seven other jurisdictions permitted recovery. Id.
at 220–21. The court attributed this trend in favor of recognizing prenatal claims to all the
advances made in medical science since Newman was decided. Id. at 219–20. The court
noted that justice demanded the reexamination of the Newman rule and its subsequent
overruling. Id. at 222.
See, e.g., Martin v. St. John Hosp. & Med. Ctr. Corp., 517 N.W.2d 787, 789 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1994).
127

128

129
130
131

Id.
Id.
Id. at 789–90.
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preconception torts is unnecessary, unjust, and contrary to fundamental and
traditional principles of . . . tort law.” 132
Some courts employing preconception injury claims have focused
on whether the injured party was foreseeable. 133 Notably, children born
injured from a doctor’s negligence in treating their mother have been
interpreted as foreseeable parties—even if the child was not yet conceived. 134
Similarly, courts have reasoned beyond the concept of foreseeable parties
and have inquired into whether the child is a third-party beneficiary of a
doctor-patient relationship. 135
In such cases, courts have emphasized that, in doctor-patient
relationships, the potential child is a beneficiary of the mother’s consensual
relationship with the doctor. 136 This resembles the relationship of a thirdparty beneficiary in a contract. 137 Importantly, the doctor must have some
knowledge that the services are for the benefit, at least in part, to the third
party. 138 This was illustrated in Walker v. Rinck, where the mother was
incorrectly diagnosed with Rh-positive blood before conceiving her child
and subsequently not given proper treatment, resulting in her child’s
injury. 139 The knowledge of the third party was satisfied because the
administration of the necessary drug for Rh cases was only for the benefit of
future children. 140
Notably, unlike wrongful life, preconception injuries do not
correspond to Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem because the preconception
harm did not lead to the child’s birth. 141 It is only when conception and
negligence occur at the same time that Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem is
Yeager v. Bloomington Obstetrics & Gynecology, Inc., 585 N.E. 2d 696, 700 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1992), aff’d, 604 N.E.2d 598 (Ind. 1992).
See, e.g., Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1258 (Ill. 1977).
See id.; see also Martin, 517 N.W.2d at 789. The court in Martin noted precedence of
finding that doctors owe a duty to unborn children and children not yet conceived. Id. In
finding such duty, the court emphasized that duties owed to preconceived children arise
when the doctor’s care is aimed to protect subsequently conceived children. Id. For example,
if a doctor negligently fails to administer a test and subsequent preconception vaccine to a
woman before her pregnancy, the doctor will be found liable if a future child is born with
Rubella—the syndrome that would have been treated by the immunization at issue. Monusko
v. Postle, 437 N.W.2d 367, 369–70 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
Martin, 517 N.W.2d at 790.
Walker v. Rinck, 604 N.E.2d 591, 594–95 (Ind. 1992) (“[A] duty may be owed to a
beneficiary of the consensual relationship, akin to that of a third-party beneficiary of a
contract, where the professional has actual knowledge that the services being provided are,
in part, for the benefit of such third persons.”).
132

133
134

135
136

137
138
139
140
141

Id.
Id.
Id. at 592–93.
Id. at 595.
See Billauer, supra note 91, at 494.
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triggered. 142 Indeed, the courts that have recognized preconception injuries
took great measures to distinguish the preconception injury from wrongful
life claims. 143 For instance, the court in Walker v. Rinck explicitly stated that
in a preconception injury case, “no person shall maintain a cause of action
. . . based on the claim that but for the negligent conduct of another he
would have been aborted,” which is a wrongful life claim. 144 The court
enumerated this rule when noting that the defendant had misconstrued the
terms “wrongful life” and “preconception injury” by essentially commingling
them. 145
Ultimately, if a negligent act occurs before a child’s conception, the
child’s claim will not be barred. 146 Since the harm applies generally to any
child born, any child should be able to sue. 147 In turn, if the child’s
conception and negligent act occur at the same time, the child will suffer
from Parfit’s Non-Identity problem and the stigma against wrongful life. 148
That child will then not recover even though the damages sought by the
child are considerably similar to the damages sought by the child suffering
harm from preconception negligence. 149
The courts’ unwillingness to recognize wrongful life claims coupled
with their acknowledgment of prenatal and preconception injuries leaves a
gap in the law. Strikingly, a CRISPR child’s mistaken manipulation claim
does not fit neatly within either area of law. Although CRISPR/Cas-9 has its
drawbacks, the scientific community credits CRISPR/Cas-9 as a system that
will develop into a tool for genetic editing in the clinical context. 150 It is thus
pertinent that our legal scheme contemplates and prepares to address the
142
143
144
145
146
147

PARFIT, supra note 91, at 358–59.
See, e.g., Walker, 604 N.E.2d at 593.
Id.
Id.
See Billauer, supra note 91, at 494–95.
See id. at 497. The potential class of plaintiffs is therefore boundless in preconception

injuries.
See PARFIT, supra note 91, at 361. See also Andrews v. Keltz, 838 N.Y.S.2d 363, 366 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2007), for an example of a court dismissing a child’s wrongful life claim after an IVF
clinic used the wrong sperm to fertilize an egg. Although the court acknowledged that the
child might go through hardships since she is a different race than her parents, the court
refused to recognize these injuries as compensable. Id. Since the birth of an unhealthy child
was not a cognizable injury in New York, by extension neither could be the birth of an
otherwise illegitimate child. Id. at 368.
See Billauer, supra note 91, at 495–96.
Katrine S Bosley, Michael Botchan, Annelien L Bredenoord, Dana Carroll, R Alta Charo,
Emmanuelle Charpentier, Ron Cohen, Jacob Corn, Jennifer Doudna, Guoping Feng, Henry
T Greely, Rosario Isasi, Weihzi Ji, Jin-Soo Kim, Bartha Knoppers, Edward Lanphier,
Jinsong Li, Robin Lovell-Badge, G Steven Martin, Jonathan Moreno, Luigi Naldini, Martin
Pera, Anthony CF Perry, J Craig Venter, Feng Zhang & Qi Zhou, CRISPR Germline
Engineering—The Community Speaks, 33 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 478, 479 (2015)
(compiling expert opinions on genetic editing).
148

149
150
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question of whether a child born injured from CRISPR genetic editing has
a cause of action.
III.

THE MISTAKEN MANIPULATION CLAIM

This comment seeks to analyze whether a CRISPR child has a
cause of action by utilizing preexisting legal frameworks. In doing so, two
scenarios will be explored: first, when a doctor performs CRISPR/Cas-9
with the goal of producing a healthy baby, but the child suffers off-target
effects, and secondly, when a doctor uses CRISPR/Cas-9 to purposefully
impose a defect on a child. The first scenario will be analyzed under
negligence law, while the second will be analyzed under intentional tort law,
specifically battery.

A.

Standing

Before delving into negligent and intentional tort law, it must first
be determined whether the CRISPR child has standing. 151 Under Roe v.
Wade, the Fourteenth Amendment’s use of “person” does not encompass
those who are not yet born. 152 Consequently, the CRISPR child would not
be able to recover under Roe if standing were interpreted at the time of the
harmful act. 153 However, courts after Roe have recognized interests in
persons not yet born. 154 Indeed, a frequently cited Tennessee court stated
that “preembryos are not, strictly speaking, either ‘persons’ or ‘property,’
but occupy an interim category that entitles them to special respect because
of their potential for human life.” 155 With this rationale, standing could
reasonably be interpreted when the child is born alive. 156 Then, the CRISPR
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (“Limitation on the judicial Power of the United States is expressed by the
requirement that a litigant must have standing to sue.”) (internal quotations omitted).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973) (“[T]he word ‘person,’ as used in the Fourteenth
Amendment, does not include the unborn.”).
After all, standing requires that the individual suing be considered a person. Interestingly,
property law recognizes that a child is a person as soon as it is conceived while tort law
generally requires viability. See generally Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
A potential solution to the standing issue would be to apply property law here. Indeed, this
idea has been broached before, with some academics suggesting the utilization of property
theory in the context of reproductive advancements. See, e.g., Barry Brown, Reconciling
Property Law with Advances in Reproductive Science, 6 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 73, 84
(1995).
See In re Marriage of Rooks, 429 P.3d 579, 591 (Colo. 2018) (“[W]e acknowledge that
pre-embryos contain the potential for human life . . . . Thus, we agree with courts that have
categorized pre-embryos as marital property of a special character.”).
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992).
Philosophers would argue that children have a moral right to an “open future.” See
Feinberg, supra note 23. These rights are “anticipatory autonomy rights” and are violated
151

152

153

154

155
156
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child’s standing would be comparable to a child’s standing that sues for
preconception or prenatal negligence. 157 Impliedly, the CRISPR child would
have to be born alive to sue. 158
Furthermore, scholars have interpreted Parfit’s Non-Identity
Problem as a standing argument. 159 In doing so, it has been asserted that a
child who is born because of another’s negligence—like faulty tubal ligation
in a mother leading to a child—has no standing to sue. 160 However, Parfit’s
Non-Identity Problem does not apply to a CRISPR child’s mistaken
manipulation claim for two reasons: (1) Parfit himself suggests it is better to
avoid harm in such circumstances; 161 and (2) changing a single gene does not
necessarily result in the creation of a new person. 162
First, Parfit suggests it is better to avoid harm. 163 As discussed in Part
164
II, Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem primarily concerns a situation that results
in life when the alternative would result in no life. 165 For instance, a botched
abortion, failed vasectomy, or faulty tubal ligation all lead to a child in
Parfit’s world. 166 Had these procedures been performed correctly, the child
would never have been born. 167 Thus, a child now exists in a situation where
there would not have been a child. 168 Moreover, there would not have been
a child but for the negligence of another. 169 Importantly, the use of
CRISPR/Cas-9 on an embryo does not necessarily result in life where there
would have been no life. A child born of CRISPR/Cas-9 genetic editing is
more analogous to another circumstance Parfit broached: where, in
different circumstances, the same number of people would have been
born. 170 In other words, whether or not CRISPR/Cas-9 is used on an
embryo, it is likely that someone would be born. This becomes more

when the child’s opportunities are limited. Id. Some dicta in prenatal tort cases support this
moral right as a legal right. See, e.g., Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (N.J. 1960)
(“[J]ustice requires that the principle be recognized that a child has a legal right to begin life
with a sound mind and body.”).
See supra Section II.C., for a discussion of prenatal and preconception injuries.
See supra note 156. Note that whether a child could sue while it is in the womb is beyond
the scope of this comment.
See Billauer, supra note 91, at 480.
157
158

159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170

Id.

PARFIT, supra note 91, at 363–64.
See infra notes 172–86 and accompanying discussion.
PARFIT, supra note 91, at 363–64.
See supra Section II.B.
PARFIT, supra note 91, at 361.
See id. at 358–59.
See Smolensky, Symposium, supra note 92, at 411 n.6.
See Billauer, supra note 91, at 480.
PARFIT, supra note 91, at 358–59.
Id. at 363–64.
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apparent when considering that people would seek out CRISPR/Cas-9
therapy when they are adamantly trying to have a child.
Similarly, altering a few genes in an embryo does not invoke
Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem. 171 To say that one gene determines a person’s
identity is placing too much emphasis on genes. 172 Indeed, there is a
longstanding debate regarding whether someone’s behavior is determined
by their genes or by their environment. 173 Appropriately, this debate has
been termed “nature versus nurture.” 174 Scientists have long considered the
nature versus nurture argument, 175 studying combinations of identical twins
who were raised together, identical twins who were separated, and fraternal
twins. 176 Although behavioral geneticists have correlated traits like aggression
to certain genes, 177 scientists usually recognize that nature and nurture are
interwoven together. 178 Consequently, a child more prone to aggression can
See infra notes 172–86 and accompanying discussion.
See Smolensky, Creating Children, supra note 15, at 333.
See Carl Zimmer, You Are Shaped by the Genes You Inherit. And Maybe by Those You
Don’t, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/25/science/children171
172
173

parents-genes-education.html [https://perma.cc/HG9S-58GL] (noting that the question of
whether psychological traits are influenced by heredity or the environment was posed by
Francis Galton in the nineteenth century).
174
175

Id.
See Sarah Mae Sincero, Nature and Nurture Debate, EXPLORABLE (Sept. 16, 2012),

https://explorable.com/nature-vs-nurture-debate [https://perma.cc/S25Q-3JBT] (“One of
the hottest issues against nature theory is that there may be an existing ‘gay gene’, which
explains that gays are actually born that way. Another issue is that the criminal acts, tendency
to divorce and aggressive behavior causing abuse can be justified by the ‘behavioral genes’
once the researchers have proven their existence.”).
See ROBERT PLOMIN, NATURE AND NURTURE: AN INTRODUCTION TO HUMAN
BEHAVIORAL GENETICS 47 (1990); see also Zimmer, supra note 173.
Auke Tellegen, David T. Lykken, Thomas J. Bouchard, Jr., Kimerly J. Wilcox, Nancy L.
Segal & Stephen Rich, Personality Similarity in Twins Reared Apart and Together, 54 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1031, 1036 tbl.4 (1988). Based off twin studies, the authors
found that the most significant trait variances were attributed to genetic differences instead of
environmental differences. Id. at 1036. Thus, the authors concluded that “personality
differences are more influenced by genetic diversity than they are by environmental
diversity.” Id. This conclusion was contrary to older studies where scientists concluded that
traits like aggression are linked more closely to the environment. See, e.g., Albert Bandura,
Dorothea Ross & Sheila A. Ross, Transmission of Aggression Through the Imitation of
Aggressive Models, 63 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 575, 575–82 (1961). In such studies,
children in pre-school were exposed to aggressive and non-aggressive adult behavior. Id. at
575. Then, the children were observed separately of the adult model to see if they would
imitate the adult behavior. Id. Ultimately, the children exposed to the aggressive model
demonstrated aggression at a markedly higher level than that of the children exposed to the
non-aggressive model. Id. at 582.
David Rettew, Nature Versus Nurture: Where We Are in 2017, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Oct.
6, 2017), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/abcs-child-psychiatry/201710/natureversus-nurture-where-we-are-in-2017 [https://perma.cc/6C8E-HR3K]. At the end of the
twentieth century, the debate over nature versus nurture largely shifted to a recognition of
176

177

178
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treat this disposition through things like psychotherapy, parental guidance,
and healthy living—all nurturing factors. 179
Moreover, the interaction of genes with the environment, termed
epigenetics, 180 has shown that genes may manifest differently because of their
environment. 181 Thus, both genetic factors and environmental factors play a
role in the development of traits. 182 This is observed by noting that infants
possess vast genetic possibilities in brain development, but their
environment determines what genetic material is incorporated. 183

“nature and nurture.” Id. This shift was attributed to both the human genome project and
various twin experiments that were being conducted. Id. Today, scientists ultimately
recognize that “the nature and nurture domains are hopelessly interwoven with one another.”
Id. Thus, while genes can influence one’s perception of their environment, their
environment can influence the magnitude of what genes are expressed. Id.
Id.; but see ROBERT PLOMIN, BLUEPRINT: HOW DNA MAKES US WHO WE ARE ix, 186
(2018) (finding that genes account for half of the differences between us and the rest is
determined by random experiences, but that nonetheless, these systematic experiences are
still influenced by one’s genetic trajectory).
Michael P. Vandenbergh, David J. Vandenbergh & John G. Vandenbergh, Lamarck
Revisited: The Implications of Epigenetics for Environmental Law, 7 MICH. J. ENVTL. &
ADMIN. L. 1, 1 (2017).
Evan Nesterak, The End of Nature Versus Nurture, BEHAV. SCI. (July 10, 2015),
https://behavioralscientist.org/the-end-of-nature-versus-nurture/ [https://perma.cc/QKR6F27P]; see also Michael J. Meaney & Moshe Szyf, Environmental Programming of Stress
179

180

181

Responses Through DNA Methylation: Life at the Interface Between a Dynamic
Environment and a Fixed Genome, 7 DIALOGUES CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 103, 103

(2005) (observing that rats who were well groomed by their moms in infanthood were less
stressed in adulthood than rats who were not well groomed).
DAVID S. MOORE, THE DEVELOPING GENOME: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL
EPIGENETICS 5–6, 11 (2015) (“DNA can’t single-handedly cause any of our characteristics!”).
Jane Rutherford, Symposium: Juvenile Justice Caught Between the Exorcist and a
Clockwork Orange, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 715, 732 (2002).
182

183
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If these arguments are not persuasive, consider that cancer changes
a person’s DNA. 184 Likewise, pregnancy, 185 and bone marrow transplants, 186
can add to a person’s original DNA. If DNA were one hundred percent
imperative to one’s identity, it would follow that the people exposed to the
above circumstances have altered personalities. Most would accept that this
is not the circumstance and must therefore accept that DNA is not outcome
determinative of a person’s identity.
Consequently, Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem does not apply to a
CRISPR child’s mistaken manipulation claim for the two reasons discussed
above: (1) Parfit himself suggests in such circumstances it is better to avoid
harm; 187 and (2) changing a single gene does not necessarily result in the
creation of a new person. 188 Therefore, Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem does
not defeat a CRISPR child’s claim due to a lack of standing. Now that
standing has been asserted, the two scenarios of negligent editing and
purposeful defective editing can be explored, starting with negligent editing.
The Genetics of Cancer, NAT’L CANCER INST. (Oct. 12, 2017),
https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/causes-prevention/genetics [https://perma.cc/E7X34SF6]; see also Changes in Genes, AM. CANCER SOC’Y (June 25, 2014),
https://www.cancer.org/cancer/cancer-causes/genetics/genes-and-cancer/gene-changes.html
[https://perma.cc/2XYG-GVDG] (“Cells become cancer cells largely because of mutations
in their genes. Often many mutations are needed before a cell becomes a cancer cell. The
mutations may affect different genes that control cell growth and division. Some of these
genes are called tumor suppressor genes. Mutations may also cause some normal genes to
become cancer-causing genes known as oncogenes.”).
Ten percent of a pregnant mother’s free-floating DNA can come from the fetus that she is
carrying. Katherine Rowland, We Are Multitudes, AEON (Jan. 11, 2018),
https://aeon.co/essays/microchimerism-how-pregnancy-changes-the-mothers-very-dna
[https://perma.cc/8B44-8PXL]. After pregnancy, this amount of free-floating DNA will
decrease, but some cells will remain in the mother’s bloodstream. Id. Indeed, these cells can
even become part of the mother’s tissue. Viviane Callier, Baby’s Cells Can Manipulate
Mom’s
Body
for
Decades,
SMITHSONIAN
(Sept.
2,
2015),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/babys-cells-can-manipulate-moms-bodydecades-180956493/ [https://perma.cc/RJK6-A8SP] (“[F]etal cells cross the placenta and
enter the mother's bloodstream. Like stem cells, fetal cells are pluripotent, which means they
can grow into many kinds of tissue. Once in the mother’s blood, these cells circulate in the
body and lodge themselves in tissue. They then use chemical cues from neighboring cells to
grow into the same stuff as the surrounding tissue.”).
When a person receives a bone marrow transplant, they also receive the donor’s stem cells.
Roger Schlueter, Getting a Bone Marrow Transplant Could Give You New DNA, Too,
MED. XPRESS (Jan. 19, 2018), https://medicalxpress.com/news/2018-01-bone-marrowtransplant-dna.html [https://perma.cc/2WJJ-EYBG]. These stem cells retain the donor’s
DNA, and consequently, the person who receives the bone marrow transplant will also have
the donor’s DNA in their bloodstream. Id. The donor’s DNA has also been found in the
transplant receiver’s nails, urine, and epithelial cells that line a person’s mouth, cavities, and
organs. Id.
PARFIT, supra note 91, at 363–64.
See supra notes 172–86 and accompanying discussion.
184

185

186

187
188
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Negligence

This section will analyze the first scenario imposed on the
hypothetical CRISPR child: when a doctor uses CRISPR/Cas-9 and the
subsequent child suffers off-target effects even though the doctor aimed to
produce a healthy baby. In line with preconception and prenatal tort cases,
such a circumstance fits best within a negligence cause of action. As such,
the elements of negligence as they relate to the mistaken manipulation claim
must be examined. Therefore, the following sections will survey duty,
breach, injury, factual cause, and legal cause, respectively. 189

1.

Duty

Seeing that many preconception, 190 and prenatal claims, 191 turned on
the question of duty, this is likely to be the biggest obstacle in the CRISPR
child’s mistaken manipulation claim. Simplistically, duty can be considered
a threshold question that requires the defendant to conform to reasonable
standards of conduct. 192 Consistent with wrongful life suits, this comment will
explore a doctor’s duty to the CRISPR child without getting into the weeds
of parental duty. 193
Although some have proposed a nexus test for duty in the medical
malpractice context, 194 duty typically arises from a doctor-patient
relationship. 195 At first glance, it may seem that the doctor has no duty to the
CRISPR child because the child is not yet in existence. 196 However, courts
have seamlessly rejected that argument on the basis that “a duty may be
owed to a beneficiary of the consensual relationship, akin to that of a thirdparty beneficiary of a contract, where the professional has actual knowledge
David G. Owen, The Five Elements of Negligence, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1671, 1672–73
(2007).
See, e.g., Martin v. St. John Hosp. & Med. Ctr. Corp., 517 N.W.2d 787, 790 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1994).
See, e.g., Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 15–16 (1884), abrogated by Angelini v.
OMD Corp., 575 N.E.2d 41 (Mass. 1991).
In re Thrash, 433 B.R. 585, 596 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2010).
Children generally sue their health care providers in wrongful life. Shawna Benston,
189

190

191

192
193

Yesterday’s Child, Tomorrow’s Plaintiff: Why We Should Expect an Uptick in WrongfulLife Suits Following Embryonic Application of Gene-Editing Technologies, 19 AM. J.

BIOETHICS 41, 41 (2019). However, courts are wary of interpreting whether a child can sue
their parents in wrongful life. See Tomlinson v. Metro. Pediatrics, LLC, 412 P.3d 133, 152
n.18 (Or. 2018).
See generally Browne, supra note 21.
Johnson v. Thompson, 650 S.E.2d 322, 323 n.4 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
Powell III, supra note 120, at 355 (“[E]very physician-patient relationship requires a patient
to exist. As a general rule, if a duty does not exist to a person (or class of persons, of whom
the injured party is a member) at the time a wrongful act or omission occurred, the person
cannot recover for injuries that the wrong caused.”).
194
195
196
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that the services being provided are, in part, for the benefit of such third
persons.” 197 Likewise, courts have inferred that it would be ludicrous to deny
recovery just because a negligent act occurred before a child was born or
conceived. 198 Courts have also reasoned that doctors have a duty to unborn
children when the possibility of children is reasonably foreseeable. 199
In landmark cases where duty was extended to those not yet
conceived, courts have determined the duty of the physician to the unborn
“by balancing (1) the relationship between the parties, (2) the reasonable
foreseeability of harm to the person injured, and (3) the public policy
concerns.” 200 Importantly, all three prongs and all aforementioned rationale
support the extension of finding that a doctor owes a duty of care to the
CRISPR child.
Beginning with the first prong—the relationship of the parties—it can
be seen that the CRISPR child is a beneficiary of the parent’s consensual
relationship with the doctor. 201 Importantly, the CRISPR child’s doctor
would be aware that CRISPR was being performed for the benefit of the
child. 202 Like the Rh cases where a mother would only receive the
medication RhoGAM to protect future fetuses growing in utero, 203 in this
hypothetical, parents would only seek out CRISPR/Cas-9 to hopefully better
their child. Thus, the first prong is satisfied based on the analogous
relationship between a CRISPR child and a doctor and the comparable
relationship of a preconceived child and a doctor. 204
Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992, 996 (Ind. 1991).
See, e.g., Martin v. St. John Hosp. & Med. Ctr. Corp., 517 N.W.2d 787, 789 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1994).
See Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 637 N.E.2d 1250, 1258 (Ill. 1977). This is in accordance
with older notions of tort law, as the “duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to another
does not depend upon contract, privity of interest or the proximity of relationship between
the parties. It extends to remote and unknown persons.” Wintersteen v. Nat’l Cooperage &
Woodenware Co., 197 N.E.2d 578, 582 (Ill. 1935).
Martin, 517 N.W.2d at 790. Using these three prongs, the court in Martin held that a
doctor owed a duty to a fetus that was conceived after the defendant had performed a
cesarean. Id. at 493.
Walker v. Rinck, 604 N.E.2d 591, 594–95 (Ind. 1992).
For instance, a parent seeking to treat Duchenne muscular dystrophy (DMD), inherited
childhood blindness, or sickle-cell disease would seek out CRISPR/Cas-9 therapy as a “onetime” cure for their child. Shelly Fan, The Three Frontrunners in the CRISPR Therapy
Race, SINGULARITYHUB (Apr. 7, 2019), https://singularityhub.com/2019/04/07/the-threefrontrunners-in-the-crispr-therapy-race/ [https://perma.cc/J3KD-S9XT]. Since Fan’s article,
two patients have received CRISPR/Cas-9 treatment for sickle-cell disease and another blood
disorder, beta thalassemia. Sharon Begley & Adam Feuerstein, First CRISPR Treatment for
Blood Diseases Shows Early Benefit in Two Patients, STAT (Nov. 19, 2019),
https://www.statnews.com/2019/11/19/first-crispr-treatment-for-blood-diseases-shows-earlybenefits/ [https://perma.cc/63JF-KG2F].
Walker, 604 N.E.2d at 595.
197
198

199

200

201
202

203
204

See id.
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Likewise, the second prong of reasonable foreseeability is satisfied
when focusing both on whether the victim was foreseeable and whether the
harm suffered was foreseeable. 205 The victim—a CRISPR child—is
foreseeable considering that a doctor specializing in CRISPR/Cas-9 genetic
editing would likely hold himself or herself out as a specialist trained to do
exactly what was sought out. 206 Moreover, harm is foreseeable even when a
child is not yet conceived. 207 In Albala v. City of New York, the court
recognized it was foreseeable that a mother might birth an injured child after
undergoing an abortion that perforated her uterus seven years prior. 208 Like
the abortion in Albala, CRISPR/Cas-9 has significant risks of injury. 209 Thus,
because off-target effects are well-known dangers of CRISPR/Cas-9, 210 it
must be accepted that a specialized doctor would be aware of said dangers. 211
Lastly, CRISPR/Cas-9 genetic editing would likely not even be performed
without first executing a method that allows doctors to see the probabilities
of CRISPR/Cas-9 cleaving at unintended sites in the genome. 212 The
probability of off-target effects occurring gives rise to the foreseeability of
these effects actually occurring. 213 Consequently, the second prong
necessitating both a foreseeable victim and a foreseeable injury is met. 214
Finally, the third prong for extending a duty to the unborn considers
public policy. 215 In Webb, the court held that public policy weighed against
recognizing such an extension of duty. 216 Importantly, the Webb court was
205
206

See Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992, 996–97 (Ind. 1991).
This would be like the doctor in Martin v. St. John Hosp. & Med. Ctr. Corp., who

represented that he was a specialist in gynecology and obstetrics. 517 N.W.2d 787, 790
(Mich. Ct. App. 1994). Just as a specialist in reproductive health must be aware that his or
her job relates to fetuses and future children, the CRISPR doctor must also be aware that his
or her job would relate directly to fetuses.
See, e.g., Walker, 604 N.E.2d at 595; Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250,
1254 (Ill. 1977).
429 N.E.2d 786, 788, 790 (1981).
See supra notes 13–14, 68–77, and accompanying text discussing CRISPR/Cas-9 off-target
effects.
See Begley, supra note 14 (“[G]enome-editing might disable a tumor-suppressor gene or
activate a cancer-causing one. It might also allow pieces of two different chromosomes to get
together, a phenomenon called translocation, which is the cause of chronic myeloid
leukemia, among other problems.”).
Like there being well-known risks that a surgery performed on reproductive organs may
endanger future pregnancies, the risks of CRISPR/Cas-9 would be well known to a doctor
holding themselves out as a specialist in CRISPR/Cas-9 genetic therapy. See Martin v. St.
John Hosp. & Med. Ctr. Corp., 517 N.W.2d 787, 790 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
See supra note 76.
Basic assumptions would support that a given probability gives foresight that an event may
occur, making that event foreseeable.
See supra notes 205–13 and accompanying discussion.
See Martin, 517 N.W.2d at 790.
Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992, 997 (Ind. 1991).
207

208
209
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213

214
215
216

2020]

DESIGNING CHILDREN

327

concerned with doctor-patient loyalty. 217 The court thought that doctorpatient loyalty would be eroded if courts held that physicians have a duty to
anticipate how a patient will respond to medication. 218 Similarly, the Albala
court did not recognize a duty because it was afraid this extended duty would
incentivize doctors to forego beneficial treatment to a mother in fear of
future liability. 219 In the case of CRISPR children, none of the above public
policy concerns apply. 220 Indeed, CRISPR parallels more aptly with the Rh
cases. 221 Like the Rh cases, the performance of CRISPR/Cas-9 neither
harms nor benefits the mother and is ideally only done to better a child’s
life. 222 Accordingly, public policy supports extending a physician’s duty to
those who are not yet born.
Finding a physician’s duty to CRISPR children is consistent not
only with prenatal and preconception tort law, but also with tort law’s general
aim of compensating victims and deterring would-be tortfeasors. 223 As a duty
is already recognized to embryos or fetuses that are in utero, 224 it is not that
big of a leap to impose a duty to embryos that are ex utero. 225 After all, the
only difference is the embryo’s location. 226 Furthermore, therein exists the
argument that doctors owe a duty to society not to implant an embryo that
will be born injured. 227 The doctor’s duty to the CRISPR child would then
extend to society as a whole. 228
Lastly, there is an argument that a doctor owes a duty to the
CRISPR child because of his or her acts of misfeasance. 229 In B.R. v. West,
the court found that healthcare providers have a duty to non-patients when
prescribing medication. 230 The court reasoned that the affirmative act of
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226

Id.
Id.
See Albala v. City of New York, 429 N.E.2d 786, 790 (1981).
See Walker v. Rinck, 604 N.E.2d 591, 595 (Ind. 1992).
See id.
See id.
Powell III, supra note 120, at 358–59.
See Section II.C for a discussion of prenatal injuries and duties.
Powell III, supra note 120, at 357.
Embryos that are in utero are in the mother’s uterus. In Utero, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/in%20utero [https://perma.cc/2AEA-S3YH];
In Utero, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Meanwhile, embryos that are ex utero
are outside of the mother’s uterus. Ex Utero, DICTIONARY OF HUMAN EVOLUTION AND
BIOLOGY,
http://human-biology.key-spot.ru/search.php?key=ex+utero
[https://perma.cc/U98P-46Z2]. Thus, the only difference is where the embryo is located.
Weinberger et al., supra note 112, at 133.
227
228
229

Id.
See Misfeasance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining misfeasance as “[a]

lawful act performed in a wrongful manner”).
275 P.3d 228, 230 (Utah 2012). Briefly, the facts of B.R. v. West concern children left
parentless after a medical provider negligently prescribed medication to their father that
caused him to kill their mother. Id.
230
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prescribing medication to a patient creates a risk to the patient’s family. 231
The medical provider’s acts of misfeasance therefore called for the
extension of duty. 232 Along the same lines, it stands to reason that the
doctor’s act of misfeasance in performing CRISPR/Cas-9 creates a duty
owed to the CRISPR child. 233
In sum, doctors owe a duty to the CRISPR child such that the first
element in the mistaken manipulation claim is satisfied. In keeping with tort
doctrines, this duty assures that the doctor has reasonable qualifications in
the profession and will exercise such attributes in a reasonably skillful,
diligent, and caring manner. 234

2.

Breach

Since the issue of whether a duty exists in both preconception and
prenatal tort claims has been the most prominent issue, the element of
breach has experienced diminished importance. 235 Although this is likely to
be the case with the CRISPR child’s mistaken manipulation claim, 236 it is still
important to discuss. Generally, breach is regarded as tortious conduct that
occurs when the tortfeasor does not satisfy his or her duty to another. 237 The
Renslow court memorably declared that a child has the “right to be born
free from prenatal injuries foreseeably caused by a breach of duty to the
child's mother." 238 While the Renslow court focused on the breach of a
physician’s duty owed to a mother, the same reasoning supports the
inference that a CRISPR child also has the inherent right to be born
unhindered by injuries caused when a physician breaches the duty owed to
the child. 239

231
232

Id. at 233–34.
Id. at 231–33.

This would be analogous to extending parental duties to acts of misfeasance. See
Smolensky, Creating Children, supra note 15, at 302.
See Worster v. Caylor, 110 N.E.2d 337, 339 (Ind. 1953) (“[T]he physician or surgeon who
assumes to treat and care for a patient impliedly contracts that he has the reasonable and
ordinary qualifications of his profession and that he will exercise reasonable skill, diligence
and care in treating the patient.”).
See Browne, supra note 21, at 2596 (“Of the four elements of negligence (duty, breach,
causation and injury), duty has taken center stage in preconception tort law, with causation
playing a significant supporting role. Breach is of diminished importance because the issue
is not whether the duty breached was the duty owed, but whether there was a duty of care to
one not yet in existence.”).
Weinberger et al., supra note 112, at 133.
See Casey v. Colo. Higher Educ. Ins. Benefits All. Tr., 310 P.3d 196, 201 (Colo. App.
2012).
Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (Ill. 1977).
233

234

235

236
237

238
239

See id.
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Notably, a tort case concerning an accident caused when a vessel
broke free from a tugboat, United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 240 gives
valuable insight into the element of breach in the CRISPR child’s mistaken
manipulation claim. In Carroll Towing Co., the court held that the owner’s
duty to prevent harm from a vessel breaking free is determined by “(1) [t]he
probability that she will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if
she does; [and] (3) the burden of adequate precautions.” 241 Mathematically,
this is expressed as B < P*L, where B is the burden of the alternative, P is
the probability of injury, and L is the severity of the injury. 242 Using this
formula, the court determined that the burden for an employee to be on
board the vessel being tugged was less than the probability of the harm
multiplied by the severity of the harm. 243 Consequently, the owner of the
vessel that broke free was held to have breached his duty because a
reasonably prudent person would have foreseen the possibility of harm and
then acted to minimize those harms. 244 After all, the cost of an alternative
was less than the cost of the harm that occurred. 245
In the CRISPR/Cas-9 context, the formula of B < P*L can be
theoretically applied to ascertain breach using off-target predicators. 246

United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). In Carroll Towing Co.,
the Grace Line chartered the Carroll tugboat to pull a barge named Anna C. Id. at 170–71.
In order to move Anna C to a different dock, the Carroll attempted a difficult maneuver. Id.
at 171. Unfortunately, this maneuver proved unsuccessful when Anna C was let loose and
subsequently floated downstream. Id. Both the Grace Line and the Carroll were sued for
Anna C’s damage, and they defended on the basis that the owner of Anna C was also
negligent. Id. They argued that Anna C would not have sunk if an employee had been
onboard Anna C to alert them of her condition. Id.
Id. at 173. When developing these three factors, the court drew attention to the fact that
every vessel may eventually break loose of her moorings. Id. Under this factor analysis,
liability attaches to the owner of the vessel when the burden of safety precautions is less than
the probability of injury multiplied by the gravity of the injury.
240

241

242
243
244

Id.
Id.
See id.; see also Doe v. St. Francis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 72 A.3d 929, 944 (Conn. 2013)

(“[A] plaintiff need not prove that the [defendant] actually foresaw . . . the extent of the harm
suffered . . . plaintiff must [simply] prove that it is a harm of the same general nature as that
which a reasonably prudent person in the [defendant’s] position should have anticipated.”);
Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 849 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (“There is negligence if a
reasonably prudent manufacturer could foresee injury as a result of its conduct, and acted
unreasonably in the light of what could be foreseen.”); Morden v. Continental AG, 611
N.W.2d 659, 675 (Wis. 2000) (“A person fails to exercise ordinary care when . . . he does
an act or omits a precaution under circumstances in which a person of ordinary intelligence
and prudence ought reasonably to foresee that such act or omission will subject the person
of another to an unreasonable risk of injury.”).
See Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d at 173.
See Kim et al., supra note 76 and accompanying text.
245
246
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Notably, off-target predicators will give the probability of injury (P). 247
Although one guide will likely have a set of different probabilities because
Cas-9 could cleave in many unintended sites, this comment recommends
the court impose a rebuttable presumption in favor of the CRISPR child.
Under this presumption, the court will value P as the highest probability
given by the off-target predictor.
At first glance, the Carroll Towing Co. formula might seem like the
perfect fit for ascertaining breach in the CRISPR child’s mistaken
manipulation claim. 248 The formula is compelling because there is a definite
value for P. 249 Nonetheless, actually using the Carroll Towing Co. formula
with set values for B and L creates issues. First, it is not known in the
scientific community what every mutation would lead to, as scientists are
“still unlock[ing] the secrets of the human genome.” 250 Moreover, the
potentially vast amount of diseases and defects would likely impose varying
levels of harm, which directly affects any attempted damage calculation. 251
Consequently, it would be impossible to impose a value that actually
indicates the severity of a potential injury. Any number given to satisfy L
would likely just be a random guess. Courts would then be left with
assigning an automatic value to L, making it a fixed number. Similarly, the
burden of the alternative on the doctor may be unjustifiably small. After all,
the doctor could simply not perform the CRISPR/Cas-9 genetic editing.
Under this, B also becomes more of a fixed number. So, if B is a relatively
small fixed number and L is also a fixed number, the only value that really
fluctuates under different circumstances is P. Looking again at the full
See, e.g., Shengdar Q. Tsai, Nhu T Nguyen, Jose Malagon-Lopez, Ved V Topkar, Martin
J Aryee & J Keith Joung, CIRCLE-seq: A Highly Sensitive In Vitro Screen for GenomeWide CRISPR–Cas9 Nuclease Off-Targets, 14 NATURE METHODS 607, 609 fig.2 (2017).
See supra notes 240–245 and accompanying discussion of the Carroll Towing Co. formula.
See, e.g., Tsai et al., supra note 247.
Researchers are currently studying the genetic component of diseases, but not all diseases
have been attributed to a specific mutation. See Genetic Disorders, NAT’L HUM. GENOME
RES. INST. (May 18, 2018), https://www.genome.gov/For-Patients-and-Families/GeneticDisorders [https://perma.cc/49YD-KC49].
Some diseases may lead to more medical treatment than other diseases. For instance,
Parkinson’s might be treated with simple dopamine administration. Neil Lava, Medications
for Parkinson’s Disease, WEBMD (Jan. 20, 2019), https://www.webmd.com/parkinsonsdisease/guide/drug-treatments [https://perma.cc/5C4J-WH5E]. In contrast, Lou Gehrig’s
Disease, a neuromuscular disease, necessitates advanced wheelchairs or even speaking
assistance once it inevitably leads to paralysis. Steven Dowshen, Lou Gehrig’s Disease (ALS),
NEMOURS (Nov. 2017), https://kidshealth.org/en/kids/als.html [https://perma.cc/4LKRH486]. Notably, even the same disease or defect could lead to differing levels of severity and
consequently damages. See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 964 (Cal. 1982). Because the
court in Turpin granted damages consistent with the cost of deafness, including specialized
teaching and hearing equipment, it can be inferred that these damages would be less if the
plaintiff wasn’t completely hard of hearing—simplistically, there would be less rigorous
teaching expenses, and the hearing equipment might be less sophisticated. See id.
247

248
249
250

251
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Carroll Towing Co. formula, B < P*L, it can be implied that any value of
252

P with the slightest chance of off-target editing would cause a doctor to
breach their duty to the CRISPR child. 253
Notably, the burden of the alternative, B, would be larger if the
court considered the CRISPR child’s life with whatever defect the doctor is
trying to eradicate. Under this, B would vary with the severity of the child’s
known defect. Doctors would then have more leeway in treatments for
objectively bad diseases. The added leeway in the CRISPR/Cas-9 context
would translate into using CRISPR/Cas-9 systems with more chances of offtarget editing. However, this may be reasonable seeing as there is a sound
interest in finding ways to eliminate certain diseases. 254
Ultimately, the B < P*L formula is a useful tool when analyzing
breach in the CRISPR/Cas-9 context, but it cannot be stringently followed
by literally plugging in numbers. This comment thus recommends that
courts consider the above factors, but also look on an ad hoc basis at what
another doctor would do in a similar situation. 255 This is similar to a
proposed breach of duty in reproductive-negligence cases. 256 That is, a
physician breaches his or her duty of care when his or her conduct falls
below “what is ‘reasonable to expect of a professional given the state of
medical knowledge at the time of the treatment in issue.’” 257 Finally, the court
should also consider any legislation Congress passes that clarifies what
diseases are “fair-game” to edit and in what circumstances CRISPR/Cas-9
can be used on human embryos. 258

3.

Actual Injury

A claim for negligence usually requires the element of actual
injury, which is distinguishable from speculative injury. 259 The rationale
behind needing an actual injury is to secure “the rights of individuals by
putting within their reach suitable redress whenever their rights have been
252

See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).

Rudimentary math reveals that if B is small and L is fixed, any value of P that makes P*L
greater than B leads to a breach under the Carroll Towing Co. formula.
Various groups are dedicated to raising funds for scientists to find cures to diseases. See,
e.g., About NTSAD, NAT’L TAY-SACHS AND ALLIED DISEASES, INC. (Aug. 8, 2019),
https://www.ntsad.org/index.php/about [https://perma.cc/YN64-PCWZ] (“Leading the Fight
to treat and cure Tay-Sachs, Canavan, Sandhoff, GM1 and related diseases.”).
Like typical medical malpractice claims, a breach would be observed when a doctor does
not take the same care another doctor with a similar background would have taken in the
same or similar circumstance. Foster v. Klaumann, 294 P.3d 223, 229 (Kan. 2013).
See Fox, supra note 16, at 215.
See id. (quoting Nowatske v. Osterloh, 543 N.W.2d 265, 272 (Wis. 1996)).
See Baltimore et al., supra note 7, for an example of a cautious approach to human genetic
editing.
See Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684, 688 (Mich. 2005).
253
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255

256
257
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actually violated.” 260 Thus, only an actual injury and not a speculative injury
will be recognized under negligence theory. 261 Unfortunately, the distinction
is not always clear. 262
Some courts have denied negligence claims where the injury was
observed by increases in medical monitoring. 263 Such courts have typically
held that increased medical monitoring is simply speculation of future
harm. 264 However, the majority of courts have held that increased medical
monitoring is a present injury. 265 The policy reasons behind the recognition
of medical monitoring as an injury extends to public health interests,
deterrence, the interest in early detection of disease, and societal notions of
justice and fairness. 266
In the context of CRISPR/Cas-9, a child may not immediately
show physical signs of disease. 267 It is therefore pertinent that the court
recognizes increased medical monitoring as an injury suffered by the
THOMAS M. COOLEY & D. AVERY HAGGARD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS, OR
THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENTLY OF CONTRACT § 32 (4th ed. 1935) (ebook).

260

Right v. Breen, 890 A.2d 1287, 1293–94 (Conn. 2006).
See, e.g., Sadler v. PacifiCare of Nev., Inc., 340 P.3d 1264, 1272–73 (Nev. 2014). Here,
the court discusses whether ongoing medical monitoring is a legal injury when there is no
exposure to a specific toxin but simply exposure to unsafe conditions. Id.
See, e.g., Hinton ex rel. Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So. 2d 827, 829 (Ala. 2001) (holding
that recovery for medical monitoring will not be granted absent an apparent physical injury).
Note that a physical injury is required in Alabama even if it is shown that the individual was
exposed to toxic substances. The court reasons that to hold otherwise “would result in the
courts of this State deciding cases based upon nothing more than speculation and
conjecture.” Id. at 830.
Paz v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc., 949 So. 2d 1, 5 (Miss. 2007) (“Recognizing a
medical monitoring cause of action would be akin to recognizing a cause of action for fear of
future illness.”).
See, e.g., Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 825–26
(D.C. Cir. 1984); Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 823–825 (Cal. 1993).
Potter, 863 P.2d at 824; Miranda v. Shell Oil Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 655, 660 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993).
One of the diseases that CRISPR shows promise in treating is Tay-Sachs. See Sharon
Begley, New CRISPR Tool Has the Potential to Correct Almost All Disease-Causing DNA
Glitches,
Scientists
Report,
STAT
(Oct.
21,
2019),
https://www.statnews.com/2019/10/21/new-crispr-tool-has-potential-to-correct-most-diseasecausing-dna-glitches [https://perma.cc/TPV5-U75A]. Since CRISPR could potentially cure
Tay-Sachs, it follows that the CRISPR/Cas-9 system can edit the four nucleotides in the gene
that is attributed with Tay-Sachs, HEXA. See id. Now, if the CRISPR/Cas-9 system edited
an otherwise “healthy” HEXA gene via an off-target effect, it is possible that the HEXA gene
is mutated to now resemble the HEXA gene found in individuals with Tay-Sachs. Thus, the
off-target effect of that CRISPR genetic editing is a child born with Tay-Sachs. Unfortunately,
Tay-Sachs is not a disease that can be diagnosed immediately and may only manifest between
the
ages
of
two
and
ten.
See Tay-Sachs Disease, HEALTHLINE,
https://www.healthline.com/health/tay-sachsdisease#targetText=People%20with%20the%20juvenile%20form,%2C%20muscle%20cram
ps%2C%20and%20tremors [https://perma.cc/B7K3-RF4E].
261
262
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265

266
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CRISPR child. 268 Note that if the CRISPR child immediately displays signs
of an injury, the price of medical monitoring would simply be part of the
damages in the actual injury. 269
Lastly, legal scholars have debated what constitutes a disability in
the eyes of the court. 270 In this realm, courts could either follow disability
laws and objectively determine what constitutes a disability, or they can use
an alternative “market-based methodology.” 271 Under a “market-based
methodology,” courts would recognize a defect that “most honest people
would agree render the child’s existence an injury.” 272 This comment
recommends following such a “market-based methodology,” which will
hopefully allow courts to take an honest look at what society currently
considers a disability. 273

4.

Factual Cause

A defendant is typically the factual cause of an injury when they are
a but-for cause of the plaintiff’s injury. 274 A cause is considered a but-for
cause when the event would not have occurred but for the defendant’s act. 275
In the medical malpractice context, a plaintiff must prove that he or she
would have obtained a more favorable result but for the negligence of the
defendant. 276 Thus, if an event would occur regardless of how the defendant
acts, the defendant’s conduct cannot be considered a but-for cause. 277
In the case of the CRISPR child, but-for causation will not be a
substantial issue. 278 Notably, a doctor will have to sequence the CRISPR

268
269

See Potter, 863 P.2d at 824–25.
See McLeod v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 591 So. 2d 621, 624 (Fla. 1992) (“[T]he damages

recoverable . . . are those damages which are the natural, proximate, probable, or direct
consequence of the [act].”); see also Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1965)
(“[T]he primary basis for an award of damages is compensation [and] the objective is to make
the injured party whole.”).
See Weinberger et al., supra note 112, at 130.
270

Id.
Id. (quoting Wendy Fritzen Hensel, The Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and
Wrongful Life Actions, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 181 (2005)).
See id.
See, e.g., Hale v. Ostrow, 166 S.W.3d 713, 718 (Tenn. 2005) (“The defendant’s conduct

271
272

273
274

is the cause in fact of the plaintiff’s injury if, as a factual matter, it directly contributed to the
plaintiff’s injury. In a case such as this one, we must ask whether the plaintiff’s injury would
have happened “but for” the defendants’ act.”).
Watson v. Meltzer, 270 P.3d 289, 293 (Or. Ct. App. 2011) (“[I]n order to prevail in a
negligence action, a plaintiff must establish that but for the negligence of the defendant, the
plaintiff would not have suffered the harm that is the subject of the claim.”).
Jeffries v. Mills, 995 P.2d 1180, 1192 (Or. Ct. App. 2000).
Hale, 166 S.W.3d at 718.
See Weinberger et al., supra note 112, at 133 (discussing proximate cause only briefly).
275

276
277
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child’s DNA before CRISPR/Cas-9 is performed. 279 Then, after
CRISPR/Cas-9 is performed, the doctor will presumably sequence the
child’s DNA again to see if the CRISPR worked. So, there will be two sets
of DNA to compare: (1) DNA before CRISPR and (2) DNA after CRISPR.
If there are differences in the DNA sequences, it can be assumed that the
CRISPR/Cas-9 editing is what changed the DNA. This assumption is not
only reasonable, but it is consistent with the tort law aim of compensating
victims. 280 Thus, but for the performance of CRISPR/Cas-9, the genetic
alteration would not have occurred.
Nonetheless, the CRISPR child may still not prevail under but-for
causation because not all diseases are linked to a specific mutation. 281
However, this comment recommends that the court presume any diseases
that manifest after CRISPR/Cas-9 editing are caused by the genetic editing.
This presumption would fit well with already established precedence that
allows a plaintiff to circumvent the traditional but-for test. 282
For instance, the court created market share liability to evade butfor causation when a faulty drug, diethylstilbestrol (DES), caused increased
risks of cancer. 283 DES was administered as a synthetic hormone with the
purpose of preventing miscarriages from 1941 to 1971. 284 During the time
drug manufacturers marketed DES, they knew or should have known of the
drug’s propensity to cause cancerous growths. 285 Nonetheless, drug
manufacturers continued to advertise DES as safe, collaborating with other
drug manufacturers in marketing, and testing the drug to create industrywide standards. 286 Because the typical DES plaintiff could not identify the
specific drug manufacturer who created the exact pill ingested, the plaintiff

Sequencing is necessary because of designing gRNAs.
Jarmie v. Troncale, 50 A.3d 802, 814–15 (Conn. 2012) (quoting Lodge v. Arett Sales
Corp., 717 A.2d 215, 223 (Conn. 1998)).
See, e.g., Alzheimer’s Disease Genetics Fact Sheet, NAT’L INST. ON AGING,
https://www.nia.nih.gov/health/alzheimers-disease-genetics-fact-sheet
[https://perma.cc/PH39-U5MK] (noting that scientists are realizing that genes play a role in
Alzheimer’s disease but don’t know exactly what genes play a role in causing it).
See infra notes 283–89.
See Sindell v. Abbott Lab’ys., 607 P.2d 924, 936 (Cal. 1980); see also Diethylstilbestrol
(DES) and Cancer, NAT’L CANCER INST. (Oct. 5, 2011), https://www.cancer.gov/aboutcancer/causes-prevention/risk/hormones/des-fact-sheet
[https://perma.cc/X8HK-FFBY]
(“The daughters of women who used DES while pregnant—commonly called DES
daughters—have about 40 times the risk of developing clear cell adenocarcinoma of the lower
genital tract than unexposed women . . . . DES daughters have an increased risk of developing
abnormal cells in the cervix and the vagina that are precursors of cancer . . . . DES daughters
may also have a slightly increased risk of breast cancer after age 40.”).
See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 925.
279
280

281

282
283

284
285
286

Id.
Id. at 926.
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would have failed under the traditional but-for test. 287 Due to the traditional
notions of fairness in tort law, 288 the court decided to create market share
liability—imposing several liability on all market participants. 289
Similarly, the multiple sufficient factors test in tort law also supports
a presumption that the CRISPR child’s disease was caused by a DNA
mutation. 290 The court in Summers v. Tice most famously put this test forth
in 1948. 291 In Summers, two hunters both independently fired guns in the
plaintiff’s direction, and although only one bullet hit the plaintiff, both
hunters were held liable for the plaintiff’s injury. 292 Thus, if but-for fails
because there are multiple sufficient causes, each cause is regarded as a
factual cause of the injury. 293
With the aforementioned exceptions to but-for causation and the
sound public policy of fairness and compensation, it follows that courts
should presume that the CRISPR child’s disease was caused by the already
established genetic alteration. 294 Under this presumption, a doctor will be
presumed to be the but-for cause of the CRISPR child’s injury so long as
there is a showing that the CRISPR/Cas-9 system effectively altered the
child’s DNA. Then, the burden can shift to the physician to show that the
disease was caused by something under the CRISPR/Cas-9 genetic editing.
The presumption will therefore be a rebuttable presumption in favor of the
CRISPR child.

5.

Legal Cause

Legal cause, or scope of the risk analysis, asks whether the
plaintiff’s injury falls within a set of injuries that are normally associated with
the defendant’s act. 295 Simplistically, legal cause will likely not be a problem
for the CRISPR child because the risks of genetic alterations are well
known. 296 Likewise, some chemical pathways that are used in CRISPR/Cas-

See Gorman v. Abbott Labs., 599 A.2d 1364, 1364 (R.I. 1991) (requiring an identifiable
defendant for tort liability).
See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 930.
Id. at 936–37.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 27 (AM. L. INST. 2012).
See Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1948).
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288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295

See id.
See Landers v. E. Tex. Salt Water Disposal, 248 S.W.2d 731, 735 (Tex. 1952).
See supra notes 283–89.
See Melchor v. Singh, 935 N.Y.S.2d 106, 110 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (noting that a ladder

without rubber feet is a proximate cause to falling off the ladder).
See Begley, supra note 14; see also JEAN BRAINARD, CK-12 BIOLOGY (2020) (ebook)
(“[A]ny random change in a gene’s DNA is likely to result in a protein that does not function
normally or may not function at all. Such mutations are likely to be harmful. Harmful
mutations may cause genetic disorders or cancer.”).
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9 genetic editing are readily recognized as error-prone. 297 For instance, the
Non-Homologous End Joining (NHEJ) repair mechanism that fixes doublestranded breaks in DNA is known to cause errors by inserting or deleting
unintended bases in the target DNA. 298 Finally, the chance of off-target
effects occurring is clearly well recognized because otherwise there wouldn’t
be such a significant need for creating off-target predicators. 299 Consequently,
the chance that the CRISPR/Cas-9 system edits an unintended site in the
genome and thereafter causes injury to the CRISPR is well within the scope
of the risk.
Although some courts have denied medical malpractice actions on
scope of the risk grounds, this is usually only an issue with intergenerational
harms. 300 In such cases, courts have historically limited recovery to certain
generations. 301 However, this comment only addresses the harm suffered by
the immediate plaintiff and not any intergenerational harm, as that is beyond
the scope of this comment.
Accordingly, a negligence claim brought against a doctor who
intended to perform beneficial CRISPR/Cas-9 genetic editing can be
satisfied when a child suffers off-target, harmful effects stemming from the
genetic editing. The first scenario has thus been analyzed, and the comment
will now explore the latter scenario of intentionally imposing defects on a
child using CRISPR/Cas-9.

C.

Battery

This section will analyze the second scenario imposed on the
hypothetical CRISPR child: when a doctor uses CRISPR/Cas-9 to
purposefully impose a defect on a child, and that child subsequently suffers
harm. In accordance with this comment’s theme of utilizing preexisting tort
frameworks, the tort claim of battery will be explored since it relates most
closely to the CRISPR child’s scenario. Notably, an actor is liable for battery
if he or she (a) acts “intending to cause harmful or offensive contact with the
person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such
a contact, and (b) a harmful contact with the person of the other directly or
Tianyuan Su, Fapeng Liu, Pengfei Gu, Haiying Jin, Yizhao Chang, Qian Wang, Quanfeng
Liang & Qingsheng Qi, A CRISPR-Cas9 Assisted Non-Homologous End-Joining Strategy
for One-Step Engineering of Bacterial Genome, SCI. REPS. 1, 1 (2016) (“[T]he NHEJ repair
mechanism tends to be prone to insertion and/or deletion (indel) mutations at the junctional
site. Thus, with the assistance of the programmable CRISPR-Cas9 DNA cleavage system,
NHEJ can generate frameshift mutations that disrupt the targeted gene[.]”).
See Walker-Daniels, supra note 56, at Figure 3.
See generally Zhang et al., supra note 65.
See Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co., 591 N.E.2d 696, 700 (Ohio 1992).
See Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 570 N.E.2d 198, 203 (N.Y. 1991) (limiting recovery to those
who ingested the drug or who were exposed to it in utero).
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299
300
301
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indirectly results.” 302 Both elements of battery will be analyzed separately in
conjunction with the CRISPR child’s mistaken manipulation claim,
beginning with the first element of intention to cause harmful or offensive
contact

1.

Intention to Cause Harmful or Offensive Contact

An act is done with intent when the actor has purpose or
knowledge with substantial certainty that the event will occur. 303 For instance,
the court in Garratt v. Dailey held that intent could be satisfied when a fiveyear-old defendant pulled his aunt’s chair out from under her. 304 Although
the defendant may not have intended to cause harm, intent was satisfied so
long as he knew that the plaintiff was going to sit in the chair. 305 In the
CRISPR child’s case, the doctor would be acting with intent because he or
she would have the purpose of imposing such a defect. After all, the doctor
would be aware of the parents’ goal of selectively having a child with a defect.
Furthermore, the act must be harmful or offensive to a reasonable
person’s sense of dignity. 306 In this case, the doctor’s actions against the
CRISPR child would easily be considered harmful. Society generally
recognizes that children should be born with “sound mind and body[]” and
an imposition of a defect would violate this principle. 307 Consistent with this
rationale, intentionally limiting a child’s opportunities before he or she even
begins life is certainly a harm. 308 If the above is not persuasive, the court
could also construe what disabilities or defects are considered injuries, as
discussed supra in the negligence part of this comment. 309 Then, the court
could employ a “market-based methodology” that classifies disabilities or
defects as harmful when the average person would think they were indeed
harmful. 310
Finally, note that it is irrelevant in this hypothetical whether the
CRISPR child is suing in a single or dual intent jurisdiction. In single intent
jurisdictions, an actor can be held liable for battery so long as they intended
to make contact—it does not matter if they did not intend to make harmful
302
303
304
305

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (AM. L. INST. 1965).

See Goodin v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, 750 N.E.2d 1222, 1230–34 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000).
Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Wash. 1955).

Id. at 1094–95.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (AM. L. INST. 1965); see also Wishnatsky v.
Huey, 584 N.W.2d 859, 861 (N.D. Ct. App. 1998).
See Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (N.J. 1960).
See Feinberg, supra note 23.
See supra Section III.B.3.
Weinberger et al., supra note 112, at 130 (quoting Wendy Fritzen Hensel, The Disabling
Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 181
(2005)).
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or offensive contact. 311 Conversely, dual intent jurisdictions require that the
actor both intended to make contact and intended that the contact would
be harmful or offensive. 312 As discussed, supra, the doctor must intend to
make harmful contact in this hypothetical because the parents are seeking
to impose a defect. Thus, the plaintiff would be able to succeed on a
mistaken manipulation claim for battery in a dual intent jurisdiction. Since
a dual intent jurisdiction is more stringent than a single intent jurisdiction,
the plaintiff would therefore be able to succeed in a single intent jurisdiction
as well. 313
Ultimately, an intentional imposition of a defect using
CRISPR/Cas-9 will therefore meet the first element of battery: intention to
cause harmful or offensive contact. The analysis will now move to the
second element of battery.

2.

Harmful or Offensive Contact Occurred

The second element of battery requires that the harmful or
offensive contact must have actually occurred. 314 In the CRISPR/Cas-9
context, the harmful contact will occur as soon as the doctor edits the
embryo—once the doctor uses CRISPR/Cas-9 on the embryo.
Consequently, the elements of battery can easily be satisfied when
a defect is purposefully imposed on a child using CRISPR/Cas-9.
IV.

DISPELLING COUNTERARGUMENTS

This comment has thus far put forth a CRISPR child’s mistaken
manipulation claim in the context of (1) negligence and (2) battery. The
claim of negligence arises in the CRISPR/Cas-9 context when a child suffers
unintended off-target effects from the CRISPR/Cas-9 genetic editing. In
contrast, battery applies when a defect is purposefully imposed on the child
using CRISPR/Cas-9 technology. The following section will explore
potential defenses that may be raised in either scenario. Section A will
briefly explore, and then dismiss, parental tort immunity. 315 Then, Section
B will enumerate why the mistaken manipulation claim does not suffer the
See, e.g., White v. Univ. of Idaho, 797 P.2d 108, 109 (Idaho 1990) (“[U]nder Idaho law
the intent required for the commission of a battery is simply the intent to cause an
unpermitted contact not an intent that the contact be harmful or offensive.”).
See, e.g., White v. Muniz, 999 P.2d 814, 815 (Colo. 2000).
A single intent jurisdiction can be considered less stringent than a dual intent jurisdiction
simply because the plaintiff only needs to show an intent to cause contact. This is a lesser
showing than what is necessary for a plaintiff to prove in a dual intent jurisdiction. See id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (AM. L. INST. 1965); see also Sanderson Farms,
Inc. v. McCullough, 212 So.3d 69, 76 (Miss. 2017).
See infra Section IV.A.
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same problem that wrongful life claims do—the inability to calculate
damages. 316 Lastly, Section C will explain why the parents’ consent to the
CRISPR/Cas-9 genetic editing does not bar the CRISPR child’s recovery. 317

A.

Parental Tort Immunity

Parental tort immunity was established in Hewellette v. George. 318
In Hewellete, a mother placed her daughter in an insane asylum in order to
gain control of the daughter’s assets. 319 The daughter sued her mother, but
the court held that the daughter could not recover because parents could
not be held liable for torts against their children. 320 The justifications for the
newly created parental tort immunity were that it protected: “a) the state’s
interest in maintaining and preserving family harmony, b) the fear of
fraudulent, collusive claims, c) the protection of family finances, d) the
protection of parental discretion and authority, and e) the analogy to spousal
immunity.” 321
Currently, most courts have withdrawn such broad parental tort
immunity. 322 Typically, parental tort immunity no longer applies to wanton
or willful misconduct on the part of the parent. 323 Other scholars have
discussed parental tort immunity in the context of genetic alterations, 324 but
any such parental tort defense would not apply in either mistaken
manipulation scenario. Although the CRISPR child may attempt to sue their
parent, the scope of this article has focused on whether the doctor
performing the CRISPR/Cas-9 is liable. Since the doctor is presumably not
the CRISPR child’s parent, parental tort immunity would not bar the child’s
claim. 325
316
317
318

See infra Section IV.B.
See infra Section IV.C.
See Hewellette v. George, 9 So. 885, 887 (Miss. 1891), overruled by Glaskox By &

Through Denton v. Glaskox, 614 So. 2d 906 (Miss. 1992).
319
Hewellette, 9 So. at 886.
Id. at 887.
Martin J. Rooney & Colleen M. Rooney, Parental Tort Immunity: Spare the Liability,
Spoil the Parent, 25 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (1991) (footnotes omitted).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G(1) (AM. L. INST. 1965) (“A parent or child is
not immune from tort liability to the other solely by reason of that relationship.”). But see
Frye v. Frye, 505 A.2d 826, 838–39 (Md. 1986) (keeping parental tort immunity in negligence
cases).
See Schenk v. Schenk, 241 N.E.2d 12, 15 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
See Grant Hayes Frazier, Defusing a Ticking Time Bomb: The Complicated
Considerations Underlying Compulsory Human Genetic Editing, 10 HASTINGS SCI. &
TECH. L.J. 39, 65–66 (2019); see also Smolensky, Creating Children, supra note 15, at 314–
17.
See Glaskox By & Through Denton v. Glaskox, 614 So. 2d 906, 909 (Miss. 1992) (“The
principle of parental immunity bars an unemancipated minor from suing her parent for
injuries caused by the negligence of the parent.”) (emphasis added).
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Inability to Calculate Damages

As the law stands today, courts may erroneously construe a
CRISPR child’s claim—a mistaken manipulation claim—as a wrongful life
claim. However, this would be improper because the CRISPR child would
not be claiming that he or she should never have been born at all. Rather,
the child would be claiming that he or she should have never been
defectively edited. With traditional wrongful life claims, the alternative to
birthing the defective child is abortion. However, with CRISPR, the
alternative to birthing the defective child is simply not to impose such
defects. The court would therefore be able to avoid the “impossibility” of
comparing a defective condition to nonexistence. 326 In assessing damages,
the court could compare the defective condition to a healthy, normal child.
The more fitting analysis to determine damages would then be injuries that
have occurred post conception. 327

C.

Consent as a Defense

The fact that the parent consented to the CRISPR child’s genetic
editing will not bar the child from succeeding on a mistaken manipulation
claim. The reasoning as to why consent does not defeat the claim is different
depending on whether the claim is a negligence claim or a battery claim.
Due to this difference, both claims will be explored independently.
Beginning with the negligence claim, courts have held that
informed consent and medical negligence are two completely separate
causes of action. 328 Where informed consent concerns the disclosure of
relevant facts so the patient can make an informed decision, 329 medical
negligence concerns whether the physician exercised the appropriate degree
of skill and care. 330 In medical negligence actions, the argument of consent
is irrelevant. 331 Consequently, the parent’s consent has no bearing on the
CRISPR child’s mistaken manipulation claim. Alternatively, CRISPR/Cas9 is such an advanced scientific concept that therein exists an argument that
the parents’ general lack of knowledge cannot be addressed by informed
consent. 332
See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. 1967) (“This Court cannot weigh the
value of life with impairments against the nonexistence of life itself.”).
See, e.g., Saunders By & Through Saunders v. United States, 64 F.3d 482, 486 (9th Cir.
1995).
See, e.g., Gomez v. Sauerwein, 331 P.3d 19, 22–23 (Wash. 2014).
Burnet v. Spokane Ambulance, 772 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989).
See Boone v. William W. Backus Hosp., 864 A.2d 1, 14–15 (Conn. 2005).
Mitchell v. Shikora, 209 A.3d 307, 311 (Pa. 2019).
See Kendall Lovell, Comment, CRISPR/Cas-9 Technologies: A Call for a New Form of
Tort, 19 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 407, 417 (2018).
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For the battery claim, it would be bad public policy to recognize
a defense that the parent consented to a third party causing intentional harm
to child. Courts look unfavorably upon child abuse, and to allow a doctor
to cause intentional harm would be contrary to protocols—such as
mandatory reporting—that place doctors in the “‘first line of protection’ for
abused children.” 333
V.

CONCLUSION

Genetic editing is no longer science fiction. Already,
CRISPR/Cas-9 has been used to edit human embryos. With the rapid pace
of CRISPR/Cas-9 achievements, it is only a matter of time before parents
can genetically alter their children. It is therefore imperative that a legal
scheme be created to allow recovery for a CRISPR child’s mistaken
manipulation claim. Courts must first recognize that the mistaken
manipulation claim is different from a wrongful life claim. Then, to
incorporate preexisting legal frameworks into the mistaken manipulation
claim, courts should look to tort law.
If a child suffers unintended off-target effects and subsequently
experiences harm, the child’s mistaken manipulation claim will mirror a
negligence claim. If a child suffers harm from a defect that was purposefully
imposed on him or her, the child’s mistaken manipulation claim will
emulate a battery claim. Without these claims, countless plaintiffs will be
left with detrimental genetic editing and no viable means of recovery.
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Becker v. Mayo Found., 737 N.W.2d 200, 210 (Minn. 2007).
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